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Near East/South Asia Report

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EFFECTS OF POLLARD CASE ON U.S. CREDIBILITY

NC110802 Cairo MENA in Arabic 0625 GMT 11 Mar 87

[Text] Cairo, 11 Mar (MENA)--AL-AKHBAR newspaper has emphasized that the crisis between Washington and Tel Aviv over the scandal involving U.S. spy Jonathan Pollard is intensifying. Pollard has been sentenced to life imprisonment after being convicted in what has been described as the most serious espionage case in the history of the United States in terms of its repercussions on U.S. national security.

In its commentary published today, the paper notes that the crisis became harsher when Charles Redman, spokesman for the U.S. State Department, violently criticized Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhaq Shamir for his statements on this issue. In his statements, Shamir said that the Pollard issue is over as far as Israel is concerned, adding that he believes there is no need to form a committee to investigate the affair. Redman's reply was that the case is not yet over for America. The paper adds that the issue is indeed not over for the United States, and not only because investigations are still under way to gather further details on this issue.

The paper notes in this respect how the United States reacted quite strangely following the Israeli raid on the PLO Headquarters in Tunis. This reaction, the paper adds, has negatively affected U.S. credibility in the eyes of the Middle Eastern Arab states, particularly the moderate ones. The paper points out that this credibility will be further undermined when the Arabs realize that were it not for the U.S. information sent to Israel by Jonathan Pollard, the U.S. Navy intelligence analyst, Israel would never have carried out such a terrorist operation. The paper goes on to say that this scandal began in 1983 when Yitzhaq Shamir was Israeli prime minister, and it continued during the period when Shim'on Peres took over as prime minister and Yitzhaq Rabin assumed the post of defense minister. The paper adds that this scandal adequately justifies a strong U.S. response toward the Israeli Government and the Israeli leaders.

Concluding its commentary, the paper says that nothing of the sort will happen and that Pollard will remain the only scapegoat in this case. The paper hopes the American public has now realized where the special U.S. Israeli relations can lead.

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CSO: 4500/74

AL-SH'AB HITS ASPECTS OF GOVERNMENT POLICY

PM101553 Cairo AL-SH'AB in Arabic 3 Mar 87 pp 1, 6

[Article by chief editor 'Adil Husayn: "You Are Unfit to Rule. Resign, for God's Sake"]

[Text] What is being hatched against us? Secrets and riddles in Egyptian politics are so numerous. In the midst of the referendum, the compilation of lists, and preparations for the elections it has been announced that an agreement has been reached with the IMF and that talks are underway in Washington concerning military debts. And Shim'on Peres came to have talks with President Mubarak.

What is being hatched against us? How are all these incidents interlinked? What was discussed in the talks with Peres? How was this linked to the deal with the U.S. State Department and the IMF? What has this not to do with the general elections? There must be a link between the elections and these moves. We do not believe that it has been decided to hold the elections simply because a constitutional error has been discovered.

Certainly, any talk of democratic rule would be ridiculous and meaningless if vital affairs are being managed with the knowledge and participation of the Americans and the Zionists, and if the nationalist forces remain remote from knowledge, let alone participation.

Nevertheless, within the limits of what we know we would like to question the government on three cases. An accusation in any of these matters is sufficient grounds to bring down the government in a respectable state.

The first case concerns the tension in the relations between Muslims and Copts.

AL-SHA'B has been addressing this issue for some time. We have said that it is time for the chain of violence and clashes to stop, but we have noticed that our warning has fallen on deaf ears.

Gentlemen, we are talking about this issue while fully aware of the dangers threatening us. We are aware of the nature of the Western and Zionist plans which aim to destroy Islamic and Arab societies. What is happening

in Lebanon should be a serious warning. The Iran-Iraq war might develop into a Shi'ite-Sunni conflict if the ones who have faith in their God and religion pay no attention. The sedition in Lebanon has in actual fact developed into this. Following the easing of the Christian-Muslim conflict, it flared up and spread within Islamic ranks between Shi'ites and Sunnis.

It was with this caution in mind and with this awareness of the dangers that we said that the recurrence of incidents of sectarian violence should not be taken lightly. We should not deal with these incidents as if they were sporadic incidents unconnected to a common cause or to a general plan. We said that the problem should be tackled at the roots and that its jurisprudential, constitutional, legal, political, social, and educational causes should be dealt with. We said that all the parties in this nation should participate in a national debate such as this. We said this, but nobody listened and incidents are spreading and escalating daily. Last week alone (Thursday) [26 February] violence spread in Bani Suwayf and then (Saturday) spread to Suhaj, where a mosque and two churches were set on fire.

Where is the government? What is a government for if not for dealing with rifts? In Egypt in particular we have always known the government to be the reliable grip that holds things together and prevents their breaking up.

Where is the government and where are the policies and the meetings and the discussions?

I mentioned in a previous article that the country is without a head of a state. And in the absence of this political leadership it was a very serious matter--the question of the relationship between Muslims and Christians to be referred to the minister of interior. It is in the hands of the minister to belittle such problems and classify them as child incidents and to resort to the use of sticks by the police.

This man is not required to go beyond the limits of his knowledge and experience; God would not assign to someone a job beyond his capacity. But even within the framework of his capacity as a policeman, has Mr Zaki Badr not heard what is being rumored about the spraying of a chemical substance at Muslim women in such a way as to print the sign of the cross on their clothing? I personally heard of this story last month from 20 people from Bani Suwayf and Asyut, and I trust the truthfulness and accuracy of some of them. I have also heard other amazing stories. How is it that the minister of interior has not heard of anything like this?

If the minister says that news of the incidents has not reached him then his duty is to resign immediately. If he says that he did hear of this matter then we should ask him what actions has he taken in relation to what he has heard. Has he investigated this matter? Why have the results of the investigation not yet been announced so as to ease tensions and calm passions?

This cross-marking is an act aimed at provoking passions and unleashing hostile tendencies. If the news of this act proves to be true then the person who committed it is a saboteur and a suspect. Whatever his faith he is an enemy of the Muslims and equally of the Copts at the same time. If this act proves to have taken place then the Copts will compete with their Muslim brothers in assisting the authorities to arrest this criminal or gang.

So why has the government not yet moved? A police officer would immediately respond to an incident of far less gravity than this. Why has he failed to respond here? A zealous young Muslim would imagine that the negligence of the Ministry of Interior is a sign of submissiveness and laxity in protecting sacrosanctity and dignity. The Copts would interpret the Interior Ministry's negligence as casting suspicion on innocent people and exposing them to threats and harm, leaving them without protection or defense.

Why has the Ministry of Interior not acted during the past period within the strict terms of its authority as the organ responsible for the security of individuals and for public internal security? Is this gross negligence or is it deliberate collusion in favor of the devil in order to create sedition?

What is certain is that Mr Zaki Badr will not resign because of what has happened. It is also certain that those above Zaki Badr will not request him to abandon his ministry. Therefore the responsibility for protecting our nation now falls on our own shoulders.

The government is dead and we have to depend on ourselves alone. In this regard we will, God willing, lay down an integral plan to confront and thwart the enemies' plot. But until this is achieved we can call upon Muslim youth everywhere. Youth is the proponent of the [Islamic] call on whom rests the hope of building an Islamic state, an objective which, if you realize, is a dear one.

Young men, our belief in our religion does not deny the fact that we, together with the Copts, are a nation confronting the Western crusade and Zionism. We have been so and, God willing, we shall remain so. Western Christianity has tried to win over the old Egyptian Church to its side but has failed at all stages thanks to the Islamic state's fidelity to those among its sons with whom it has concluded a treaty, as well as thanks to the nobility of the Coptic Church.

O youth, our duty today is to thwart all the enemies' plots as we did in the past. This requires patience and self-control. Even if some of us believe that a number of our Coptic brothers have made mistakes, our duty is to be patient and just despite the rancor displayed by some people.

Since the government is dead and we have now to resort to our own solutions, it is also our duty to request the advocates of Islam to give this issue the attention it deserves. Undoubtedly their moving to the scene of these incidents will considerably help to extinguish the fires.

We also ask some Coptic brothers to avoid arousing suspicion by their behavior. It would help if the wise people among them join hands with the wise people among us. Brothers, come out of your isolation, the world is still a good place. When we are together in political and social action our mutual understanding will deepen and our harmony and friendship will strengthen.

Now we move on to the second case, which concerns the importation of food-stuffs contaminated with nuclear radiation. We will not go into detail because of what has already been published. But we would specifically refer to what is published on page three of this issue, especially Dr Ni'mat Ahmad Fu'ad's article.

The government has fumbled and admitted, or was about to admit, what happened. It then retracted what it said and resorted to fragmentary statements and admissions. Therefore some progovernment writers had to admit that the government was wrong both in its behavior and in the way it dealt with the matter, thus losing the public confidence.

In fact the issue is too large and far too serious to be described just as a mistake in dealing with the situation. We are facing a terrible crime and protection of criminals. All our attempts to blackmail, provoke, and defy the government have failed to shake the government out of its silence. Here too we are facing grave negligence in matters that should not be neglected. Who has been punished in this connection? What is that terrible power that forces the country's officials to keep their mouths shut?

Whenever will the government resign, whenever will a minister or an official resign, if this is not happening on such an occasion?

Now we reach the third case, which concerns the elections.

Mr Ahmad Baha' al-Din [progovernment journalist] interfered in the discussion of these elections when he imagined at the beginning that the dissolution of the People's Assembly might reflect a move, even a limited one, to improve the democratic process. Baha'-al-Din tried to control the discussion by advising us to stop determining for now what is correct and what is wrong in the rules of democracy and elections. He said that the discussion should be limited to what is and what is not constitutional because this was more appropriate for making a change. Undoubtedly he was right.

But his attempt to control the discussion failed despite the constitutional weapon he raised. Electoral procedures continued to disregard objections.

Well, in this question of ours we are more modest in our demands than Mr Ahmad Baha'-al-Din. We do not demand a change in the law in respect of the Constitution or anything else. We only demand the elimination of the suspicion of election fraud.

What draws the attention here is that the government is no longer embarrassed by stories of fraudulent malpractice. When officials hear charges of fraud against them they smile in mockery and contempt. The natural thing is for one to be terrified when accused of fraud. What has happened in this world? The government no longer appears to be sufficiently zealous for honor and reputation. It no longer cares about responding to opponents and "slanderers"! But the subject of election fraud is in fact too great and serious to be ignored. We say this despite our realization of the difficulty of responding to such accusations against the government. The government (especially the ministries of interior and local government) was involved in a considerable number of incidents of interference, fraud, and other similar actions that are difficult to justify or deny. The citizens themselves have experienced this and it is now impossible, for instance, to convince anyone of the authenticity of the results of the recent referendum or the Consultative Council's referendum, let alone the 1984 People's Assembly elections.

We are not seeking from the government a denial or a justification. We are asking the government to promise it will hold fairer elections. It can say that it will do so in the light of the lessons learned from past experiences and after studying the shortcomings that ruin the results. There is nothing dishonorable in making this statement as proposed.

I would go beyond this to say: A "smart" government has to say this even though it may not be sincere enough to carry it out. I believe it is not "smart" to publicly and openly rig elections. Some shame is desirable, at least for the sake of foreign correspondents, let alone for our sake, we the Egyptian people!

The government is ignoring the specific proposals that would prevent or limit election fraud. Which means that it intends to continue on the same road. To remind the reader-voter, we say that the proposals can be summed up (within the time limit set for this battle) as follows: Institution of judiciary supervision of the elections in place of the Ministry of Interior. Also, ending the NDP monopoly of the central media, especially the official press, radio, and television.

Holding free elections is a significant moral gain for every member of society. I believe that the fact that the government is renowned for lies and malpractice will contribute to the spread of all the undesirable values in society, and particularly among young people. But in addition to this moral aspect there is also a political gain evident in our sincere desire to revive hopes for a potential reform through legal methods.

The people are looking to Islam as a program and a state. The people believe that Islam achieves independent development and spreads prosperity and compassion. Can the People's Assembly accommodate such hopes? Can those representing such hopes reach the People's Assembly? Can the candidates on the Socialist Labor Party's SLP list reach the People's Assembly if this is the nation's will?

Suspensions--not to mention accusations--about the integrity of any government in relation to elections would immediately and definitely lead to its being changed. Nevertheless no wise Egyptian would expect this to take place. Therefore we have to rely on our own solution, on our belief, and on our arms in going to the ballot boxes to protect them from tampering. May God bestow success.

Finally I would like to caution the reader that the reasons we listed in this article for "removing" the government are not related to the stands on general policy on matters of the Shari'ah and public freedoms or matters relating to economic issues and international relations. We have mentioned nothing of this kind. We want to say: Even if the NDP policies continue to be pursued, the present government will fail to implement them. This means that the policies are a disaster and their implementation, God forbid, is even worse. But we hope relief is imminent. Such days (of varying fortunes) we give to people by turns [Koranic verse].

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CAIRO PAPER SCORES MATRUH GRAZING DEVELOPMENT SCHEME

PM111017 Cairo AL-WAFD in Arabic 5 Mar 87 p 6

[Investigative report by 'Ali Khamis: "After the Sinai Bedouins Israel Turns to the Matruh Bedouins; Zionist Plan to Starve Western Desert Bedouins"]

[Excerpts] There is a new Zionist scheme to brainwash the simple bedouins of Egypt. After Israel laid a trap for the Egyptian fellah and succeeded in enticing him to visit Israel under the pretext of agricultural cooperation, the Zionist scheme is aiming at penetrating the brains of the simple bedouin. In fact visits, which initially were secret, have been made to the bedouins in their tents. Israeli women have also visited the Arabs' wives in their tents and had tea and food with them under the slogan of normalizing relations.

What is worst of all is the fact that Dr Yusuf Wali [Deputy Prime Minister and Agriculture and Food Security Minister], who had taken part in laying this Israeli trap for the Egyptian fellah, is sponsoring the new Jewish scheme to brainwash the simple Egyptian bedouin in collaboration with the United States.

AL-WAFD will here expose this new scheme and how it was prepared by the American, Israeli, and Egyptian sides.

The curse of the Jews is pursuing the simple Egyptian bedouin. This is a new comedy planned by Israel after it had earlier succeeded in enticing the Egyptian fellah to visit Israel and brainwashing him under the pretext of cooperation in the agricultural field. The Egyptian fellah returned from Israel with pronouncements such as "The Israelis are a good people... They want to live... They are a peace-loving people... Relations must be normalized."

The question of brainwashing the Egyptian bedouin has now become the main preoccupation of Israel and the United States. The seriousness of the matter here lies in the fact that while the Zionist scheme had earlier aimed at the intelligentsia's factions, scientists, politicians, and writers, now this cancerous scheme is mainly targeted at the ordinary

toiling people who constitute the broad base of society, indeed the backbone of this nation. The scheme exploits the crises that are crushing these people.

If the Egyptian fellah went to Israel with the encouragement of Dr Yusuf Wali it is Dr Wali too who has also encouraged and supported this amazing scheme by ironing out difficulties and taking pains over the comfort of the Israeli delegations as long as this pleased the U.S. Administration and the Israeli leadership even if it were at the expense of the Egyptian citizen himself.

The scheme came under consideration in mid-1984 when the United States gave Egypt and Israel a financial grant. The terms of this grant were that it should be used to finance a joint project between the two countries. It can be said that this scheme coincided with or rather exploited what was known as the animal feed crisis from which Egypt in general and Matruh in particular had been suffering. The grazing ground had then turned into an arid desert after the number of sheep increased to 2 million from 1.3 million, according to 1979 statistics. Given that sheep are regarded as an export commodity for the Arab countries, since Matruh exports about \$25 million worth of sheep annually, the Egyptian and the Israeli sides proposed the implementation of a program for the development of grazing land in Matruh.

This was the declared Israeli-U.S. policy vis-a-vis the Egyptian side. But how did this Israeli scheme succeed in starving the population of the area and penetrating the brains of the simple Egyptian bedouin for more than 2 years?

Israel's aim has been and still is to exchange visits between the two sides and to come closer to the simple bedouin in his tent and to try to project Israel to him as being his only savior from dispersion and from the famine which threaten him.

In fact field visits by the three delegations [not further specified] began under a shroud of secrecy.

To complement this Zionist scheme an Egyptian delegation visited Israel in March 1985. The delegation from Matruh included the then head of the agricultural sector; Dr Muhammad Thana' Hasban, head of al-Nubariyah research station; and Dr 'Adil al-Biltaji.

When the Israeli and the American sides became certain that the visits had succeeded, a third open visit was made to Egypt in January 1986. The delegation included 23 men and women experts representing various Israeli scientific quarters.

This delegation was accorded an unprecedented reception by the Agriculture Ministry officials; it was also escorted by police in all its movements.

A surprising move came when the Israeli delegation revealed its ulterior motives by asking to visit the bedouins in their tents. Arrangements were in fact made and the Israelis did visit the bedouins in their camps. The Israeli and American women visited the Arab women in their tents and had tea and some food with them.

After all this has Egypt benefited from this conditional aid? Has it indeed benefited from the mythical Jewish intellect? The Israeli scheme aims at starving the area and causing it to lie fallow rather than rescuing its population from perdition and the famine that was threatening them. The Jewish side insisted on planting orache [nabat al-qatf] for cattle feed. They [the Israelis] then began distributing seedlings to the bedouins who all refused to plant them because they know that it is a salty plant and that the sheep would not eat it. But the idea on which the Israeli side insists and which the Egyptian side supports is that the farmers should plant varieties of orache which the sheep are bound to get used to in the absence of other plants, but it must be borne in mind that, in the opinion of experts, the nutritional value of this plant is limited to providing life-sustaining forage--that is, it sustains the animal's life but has no fattening benefits.

When the Egyptian side found that it had become involved in financing the production of orache seedlings, meetings were held in late 1985 with the agriculture and local administration officials in order to find a way to distribute the unwanted seedlings to the farmers, particularly since each seedling costs more than 3 pounds.

The officials in charge of the project decided to distribute 10,000 pounds to the farmers last September as an incentive for them to buy these plants. In view of the disastrous failure of this project which Israel brought along in order to save the area from famine, the Jews began planting other types of tree and bush seedlings which are used for halting soil erosion. In other words, the grazing land project has abandoned planning the development of grazing land in the arid areas. Nevertheless, the project is still enjoying full support by Dr Yusuf Wali who personally receives the Israeli delegations every time they arrive. He gives strict instructions to the ministry officials to provide them with comfort, facilitate their task, ensure that they mix with the farmers, and promote understanding between them.

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KUWAITI PAPER INTERVIEWS ISLAMIC LEADER

JN052117 Kuwait AL-ANBA' in Arabic 1 Mar 87 p 21

[Interview with Abu-al-'Ula Madi Abu-al-'Ula, member of the Egyptian Engineers Union Council and one of the leaders of the Islamic group, by Muhammad Abu-Liwayah in Cairo; date not given]

[Text] Engineer Abu-al-'Ula Madi Abu-al-'Ula, born in 1958, member of the Egyptian Engineers Union Council, one of the leaders of the Islamic group, a former chairman of the Egyptian Students Federation, and official spokesman for the Republic's Students Union.

In his public speech about Abu-al-'Ula, President Anwar al-Sadat used to say that he could close or open al-Minya University whenever he wishes. He joined the Faculty of Engineering at al-Minya University in 1976 and graduated in 1984. He was detained in 1978, 1979, and 1980. In the September 1981 incidents he was among those wanted by the authorities, but he managed to disappear for 11 months. After al-Sadat's assassination and the Asyut incidents in 1981, a request for help in his apprehension was carried by all Egyptian mass media. Newspapers and television carried his picture along with his colleague Muhyi 'Isa as "terrorists" who led the Asyut operation. The pictures were even hung at all crossing points and in public squares to expedite their detention. He managed to disappear from September 1981 until he was detained on 5 August 1982.

Recalling the black days of detention, Eng Abu-al-'Ula says: In 1978, I was detained for a few days. In 1979 I was detained for 3 months at the al-Minya public prison because of my stand on the peace agreement with the Zionist enemy. We called for a general strike at al-Minya University and other Egyptian universities. When the strike succeeded al-Sadat went mad and some of our colleagues at al-Minya University were detained. We staged a peaceful procession to the governor's house hoisting copies of the Koran. The security forces confronted us severely. We closed al-Minya University and staged a sit-in in the university's housing complex for 3 days under the siege of armored vehicles and police forces. Police commanders then negotiated with us and the sit-in was ended. Major General Zaki Badr, the current interior minister who was then an assistant interior minister, arrived for that purpose. The negotiations,

which were held on 9 April, were also attended by Dr 'Abd-al-Mun'im al-Nimr, then Awqaf minister, and the late Shaykh Najib al-Muti'i, a famous scholar in the prophetic traditions.

Afterwards, they asked me and my colleagues in the negotiations to accompany them to the office of the public prosecutor for 5 minutes for interrogation after which we could return to the university. However, the prosecutor decided to imprison us for 3 months. While I was in prison, President al-Sadat issued a resolution dissolving the students union and replacing it with a council for coordination activities. I was also detained in 1980 and remained in the al-Minya and Bani Suwayf prisons and courts of appeal for 2 months.

In early 1981, al-Sadat tried to build a wall around the university and walls separating the colleges in order to prevent student gatherings. We took a stand on the building of the wall. Therefore, al-Sadat issued a resolution closing al-Minya University for an indefinite period. I was detained in January 1981. In September 1981 I disappeared to avert detention until August 1982; the cause was former Interior Minister al-Nabawi Isma'il.

[Abu-Liwayah] How?

[Abu-al-'Ula] I was the official spokesman for the Egyptian Student Union. Many arguments occurred between me and al-Nabawi Isma'il who threatened to send me to court within 24 hours. I feared that through my detention al-Nabawi Isma'il might find an opportunity to settle his accounts with me.

[Abu-Liwayah] What is behind the disagreement between you?

[Abu-al-'Ula] We prevented the al-Minya University guards from entering the university campus. Earlier, the university's administration decided to dismiss me from the university for 1 and 1/2 years. Al-Nabawi Isma'il summoned us--Dr Hilmi al-Jazzar, brother Hishmat Khalifah, and I--to his office in the presence of Major General 'Ulaywah Zahir, then chief of the state security secret police. This was in 1980. Al-Nabawi Isma'il began to bargain. He told me: We will cancel the decision on your dismissal from the university on the condition that you calm the students. I refused to bargain with him and said: The problem lies with the guards; if the guards go away, the students will calm down. When al-Nabawi Isma'il failed in his negotiations with me, he said: You tire me; you and Muhyi 'Isa will have a special trial within 24 hours. I rejected his threats and we had a violent argument. We prevented the university guards from entering the university campus and they did not enter until after the 1981 incidents.

[Abu-Liwayah] And what else?

[Abu-al-'Ula] I recall an incident which took place prior to the dissolution of the students union in 1979. The executive office of the Egyptian

Students Union formed a delegation to meet then Interior Minister al-Nabawi Isma'il to complain about the security forces' provocations against students at the universities. I was the spokesman for the delegation and when I began to talk to him he listened to me and then said: You are complicated just like the Jews. He began to tell a story: that President al-Sadat and U.S. President Carter agreed on the presence of two Jewish divisions on the Sinai border. Afterwards, the Jews wanted to increase the number of their divisions but Carter said to them: We have already agreed on this issue. When al-Sadat found out about this he said: Let there be four instead of two divisions; we have no complicated issues in our dealings.

I said to the interior minister: This story shows that you were colluding and involved. He was upset and shouted loudly, but I interrupted him asking him to lower his voice for these reasons. [sentence as published] Particularly after the assassination of al-Sadat, the eruption of the Asyut incidents, and the publication of our pictures in newspapers, magazines, on television, and at traffic checkpoints, we decided to hide. The security forces failed to arrest us and spread rumors that we had left for Libya and Yemen. However, following the issuance of an indictment in the Jihad case and following the appointment of Major General Hasan abu Basha as interior minister, we decided to appear in public places in the center of Cairo. We were arrested in August 1982 for 7 months which I served in the al-Qal'ah and Liman Turrah jails. I was released on 5 March 1983, resumed study at al-Minya University, and obtained a bachelors degree in engineering in June 1984. In April 1985, the Board of Directors of the General Engineers Trade Union held elections. I ran for election and became a member of the trade union's council.

[Abu-Liwayah] When did the Islamic group begin to emerge?

[Abu-al-'Ula] The Islamic group emerged at the Egyptian universities at the beginning of the 1970's at the hands of a generation of the group's pioneers such as Dr 'Abd al-Mun'im Abu-al-Futuh, Engineer Muhi 'Isa, and Dr 'Isam al-'Aryan. Through this generation the group managed to win student union seats at Egyptian universities.

[Abu-Liwayah] The Islamic group emerged at the beginning of al-Sadat's rule through a green light from the authorities. What is your comment?

[Abu-al-'Ula] Sometimes, our God, the Almighty, employs some of his enemies to propagate Islam. At that time, the authorities sought to adopt a stand toward communists and Nasirites and believed that the Islamic current could be tamed. Former Asyut Governor Muhammad 'Uthman Isma'il actually tried to do so but failed, as proved by our collision with the authorities at that time. According to Shaykh Sayyid Qutb, they wanted a U.S. Islam, an Islam that only attacks communism. I believe this is false.

[Abu-Liwayah] From your viewpoint, who are the Islamic group members?

[Abu-al-'Ula] They are the Muslim youths who emerged inside the universities and later outside them as a result of the Muslim Brotherhood's call.

[Abu-Liwayah] The Egyptian scene has witnessed various Islamic groups. What is the reason for such variety?

[Abu-al-'Ula] The Islamic current in Egypt is one current, the Muslim Brotherhood's current. As for the other groups such as the Jihad group, the repudiation and renunciation group, the (al-Farmawiyah) group, the al-Tawaqquf group, and the al-Tabayyun group, they are small groups but the state attempts to enlarge and distort the image of the Islamic movement. For example, the opinion seminar program, which is broadcast by Egyptian television, hosts mentally disabled members of the repudiation and (al-Farmawiyah) groups as representatives of the Islamic group's youths in order to confuse public opinion whereas true Islam is being absented from the scene.

[Abu-Liwayah] You are accused of repudiating society. You have renounced many traditions such as education and marriage. How do you comment on this? Why do you resort to violence in trying to realize your objectives?

[Abu-al-'Ula] Egyptian and world intelligence organs tarnish the image of Islam. We do not like publicity. God be praised, we are educated. Even our daughters, sisters, wives, and women relatives are university graduates.

[Abu-Liwayah] Islamic groups express reservations about the current educational system in Egypt. What are the sciences which in your opinion are opposed to Islamic law?

[Abu-al-'Ula] We demand the Islamization of the curricula and educational methods. We oppose theories opposed to Islam such as Darwin's theory and others. We also oppose atheist philosophies. In the past, Muslim scholars divided sciences into good and bad. The bad sciences are sorcery and priesthood [al-kahnut]. Muslims must learn the good sciences because it is their duty. In general, we reject sciences which oppose Islamic teachings such as the calculation of compound interest in arithmetic because this teaches students to be usurers.

[Abu-Liwayah] How do you view the existing political parties?

[Abu-al-'Ula] The late Shaykh 'Umar al-Talmasani said there are two types of parties. One based on ideology and the other on means [ahzab wasilah]. We oppose parties in the first category whose ideology contravene Islamic teachings. In the other category, parties agree on an Islamic basis but have no way of applying it. They do not deal with details which are not clearly mentioned in the Koran and use their judgment. People are aware that differences of opinion arise within parties. Under the Islamic system, we allow diverse opinions. The current political parties are shaky and can be stopped at a certain point at any time. Islam, however, cannot be stopped as long as there is strong argument and

a convincing opinion. You know what an ordinary man told the second Caliph 'Umar: If we find you crooked, we will straighten you with our swords. Can existing parties address their leaders in this way?

[Abu-Liwayah] How do you view democracy?

[Abu-al-'Ula] Western democracy is rejected from an Islamic viewpoint. If democracy means freedom of opinion, Islam guarantees the highest level of this freedom. If it means human rights, Islam established these rights 14 centuries ago. As for the notion government of the people by the people, we do not accept it. The government is God's government. Islam allowed man to reach his own conclusions concerning issues which are not clearly mentioned in the Koran.

We oppose democracy which does not conform to the law of God, such as the British democracy whose Parliament voted in favor of homosexuality by a majority.

[Abu-Liwayah] Under Islamic government, who defines the basis of electing the caliph? Is it the Muslim scholars or the people?

[Abu-al-'Ula] We do not want to rob God of his rights and give them to the people or the scholars. God's right is the basis of Islam and the origin of government. If there is no clear text in the Koran, it will be discussed and solved by scholars and knowledgeable ones of the people.

[Abu-Liwayah] You want an immediate application of Islamic law and the current government might not be able to apply it. How can it be applied?

[Abu-al-'Ula] They do not have the intention to apply Islamic law. They say this in their own meetings and attribute this to world pressures. Islam can be applied only by a Muslim believer who is committed to Islam as a system. This does not mean we hold the government to be an infidel one, but he who wants to apply Islamic law must have a cause, believing Islam is applicable. Therefore, the government's approaches must be Islamic. By the immediate start of application, we mean swift implementation. There are issues which require years of arranging and preparation. The important thing is to start.

We support gradual application. For example, we must start with law colleges. They should produce graduates who are experts on Islamic law. The media and educational systems must start to apply Islamic law so as to prepare the atmosphere for general application. As for the closure of bars and nightclubs, they can be closed immediately. All the school curricula which clash with Islamic law must be changed.

[Abu-Liwayah] You are blamed for not presenting a clear program to solve Egypt's problems. What do you say to that?

[Abu-al-'Ula] This is not true. The books of ancient Muslim scholars contain the general details of many worldly problems. Modern changes are found in books and are ready for application. There is a lot of research dealing with the problems of the age, both in economic and political fields. I recall a discussion between us and AL-AHRAM newspaper officials Ibrahim Nafi' and al-Sayyid Yasin, director of the AL-AHRAM center for political and strategic studies, who directed at us the same question. This was a year ago. I told him: You are Muslims like us, why don't you conduct studies on this subject. Our responsibility is a common one and you must cooperate with us in these sincere efforts.

[Abu-Liwayah] How do you view the open-door economic policy, the public and private sectors, and various aspects of Egyptian economic life?

[Abu-al-'Ula] Islam has laid down general rules. For example, it rejects usury in all forms. Modern alternatives to financial dealings have appeared, such as Islamic banks and Islamic investment companies. As for the open-door policy and the public and private sector, no specific Koranic texts are available on them and are subject to Islamic discussion and opinion. As for private property, we give it our absolute support. We oppose limiting private property and wealth as long as the citizen pays his duties to God.

[Abu-Liwayah] Can an Islamic government resort to nationalization?

[Abu-al-'Ula] We do not believe in nationalization unless in cases of illegal acquisition of wealth and the hoarding of goods.

[Abu-Liwayah] Where do Islamic groups come on the Egyptian political map?

[Abu-al-'Ula] In fact, the official Egyptian political map is nonexistent to the man in the street. The real power is for the Islamic groups. If honest elections take place in Egypt, this fact will become clear. This is obvious in our gatherings and meetings.

[Abu-Liwayah] How do you view other Islamic groups? Is there coordination among you?

[Abu-al-'Ula] There are some small Islamic groups which act in a manner which may harm Islam. Coordination with such groups might harm our movement. We can only give them advice as brother Muslims.

[Abu-Liwayah] How do you view the Marxist and Nasirite organizations? Do you support the opinion that all political forces should have parties to air their views?

[Abu-al-'Ula] We reject Marxist organizations. Had there been an Islamic government, we would have used Islamic rules against them. We do not know of anything called Nasirites or Nasirism. At the present, we support establishing parties for all forces to air their views.

[Abu-Liwayah] Islamic groups are not recognized and hardly a month passes without some members being arrested. What is your comment?

[Abu-al-'Ula] Recognition or nonrecognition will not make any real difference. The Islamic current is a real thing. It is represented in trade unions and popular organizations. As for the oppression of Islamic movements, it has always existed everywhere.

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CSO: 4500/74

KUWAITI PAPER INTERVIEWS ISLAMIC FIGURES

JN101531 Kuwait AL-ANBA' in Arabic 4 Mar 87 p 27

[Interview with Dr 'Asim Fahim and Dr Badr al-Din Ghazi, Egyptian Islamic groups leaders and members of the Cairo University Teaching Staff Club, by Sawsan Abu-Husayn in Cairo; date not given]

[Excerpts] [Abu-Husayn] What is the reason behind the multiplicity of the groups which number about 28 different Islamic groups?

[Fahim] There are many different interpretations of the sayings of the prophet to explain certain religious and worldly affairs. The best known Islamic groups are: al-Jihad, al-Sunnah, the Muslim Brotherhood, the Society of Repudiation and Renunciation, the Consideration and Clarification [al-Tawaqquf was al-Tabyin], the Hizballah, the Farmawists, and the al-Salafiyah [an Islamic reform group founded by Muhammad 'Abduh].

The al-Salafiyah is divided into two groups, one in Cairo and the other in Alexandria. The group which is based in Alexandria depends on the prophet's sayings without adhering to a certain school of thought, but the group based in Cairo adheres to the Imam al-Shafi'i's school of thought. Al-Salafiyists are known for their politeness. The proof is that the issue of Jihad made the members of the group greet each other in jail. [Sentence as published]

[Abu-Husayn] How do you view current Egyptian society?

[Fahim] Every Islamic group has a different concept of Egyptian society. Every group believes the society lacks learning and understanding. Other groups believe the society lacks Islamic morality and has nothing to do with Islam. What is strange is that when you speak to any Egyptian citizen, you discover he understands the cause of the homeland very well and that this nation needs some progress to become a developing country.

[Ghazi] Egyptian society has lost confidence in previous philosophies and methods and is now seeking its roots. The secular experience before the revolution, the socialist experience, and the open-door policy experience have failed and society is seeking a suitable identity in a heritage which contains the best economic and social examples. We hope this trend will materialize on social and economic levels within years and that Islam will emerge.

[Abu-Husayn] You are charged with judging the society as infidel as well as with renouncing its traditions in many issues, foremost of which are teaching and marriage. What do you say? And why do you resort to violence to achieve your goals?

[Ghazi] Only God and the prophet can judge people as infidel and our society has never been judged as infidel throughout history. People do not link Islam to other things. This is a serious contradiction. For example, there is a night club and a mosque on al-Haram Street. As a result, people say the current system has been worked out to guarantee freedom for everyone. They say there is a time for God and a time for yourself. Therefore, Islamic groups believe they should act in accordance with the following Koranic verses: "Ye are the best of peoples, evolved for mankind, enjoining what is right, forbidding what is wrong." Therefore, we should not judge the society as infidel.

Imam 'Ali said: It is better to accept a thousand people into Islam by mistake than to expell one person by mistake. If we take Islamic law as a criterion, we will discover this nation is a renegade, not an infidel, nation, because it was ruled by Islam in the past. It is difficult for current Egyptian society to comply with Islamic law. Therefore, we urge Egyptian society to understand Islam although the society is distorted by a mixture of Turkish, Roman, French, Greek, U.S. and Soviet laws. Amid these laws, Egyptian personality has been lost. The Egyptian Muslim society should struggle against enemies and have a meeting place and a place to worship, as the prophet did in building an Islamic society.

As far as education and marriage are concerned, I personally studied in an Egyptian university. However, it is permissible in the religion to be taught by non-Muslims. The proof is that 'Umar Ibn-al-Khattab adopted the administrative system from the Persians. However, there are imported sciences which have not benefited Muslims. I do not know how Egypt is going to improve its economic standards. The strange thing is that the government is planning to rebuild the ballet institute while seeking to rationalize expenditures. We can promote and advance ourselves through other means. Moreover, what is the reason for opening the Muhammad 'Ali exhibition? There are other priorities which must be considered first and then we can turn to entertainment. As far as marriage is concerned, we do it the normal way--proposal, acceptance, and the presence of witnesses and guardians. We reject the love stories featuring our young women in the press and in television serials.

As far as the accusation against us of violence in attempting to implement our objectives, I say violence generates violence. The markets are full of books which repeatedly speak of torture carried out against Muslim brothers and Islamic groups in detention centers and prisons. The state's iron-fist policy is not reform. They should conduct dialogue with us and if that fails they should seek other means. Regrettably, when the state commits a certain mistake it resorts to committing the same mistake. Consequently, the result would be a reaction. Violence has been with us since God created Cain and Abel.

[Abu-Husayn] You want to immediately apply Islamic shari'a, but the present government may not be able to implement it. What is your view on this? How can it be applied now?

[Fahim] If we mean the shari'a, then it should be immediately applied in certain cases, such as closing wine shops and banning the export of wines. However, there are other matters which have to be gradually implemented, such as implementing limits themselves and adopting an Islamic course in social, economic, and political fields. Some violations may occur in the initial phase of the application of Islamic shari'a. However, we must not fear the side effects of the application of Islamic shari'a because we will not achieve salvation without applying Islamic shari'a. Our proof is: If the people of the towns had but believed and feared God, we should indeed have opened out to them. [Koranic verse]

[Ghazi] There is a fabricated difference between those who call for gradual application. I support both. We should immediately apply what we can and prepare the situation for things which require preparation. The most important thing is to create the appropriate psychological atmosphere and reassure the people of good intentions. We ask: Is there any harm in reducing the volume of wine sales? Also, is there any harm in lessening obscenities in TV serials and songs and night clubs? The call for prayers has no listening ears. All these issues must be settled.

[Abu-Husayn] You are accused of not proposing a clear program to resolve the problems of society and merely make public speeches. What is your comment?

[Fahim] The Islamic program is clearer than anything else. We propose general guidelines and when we have the power of implementation then you can judge us. We do not seek arguments. Islam can resolve all current problems because it is not a theoretical religion. For example, if we look carefully into the Egyptian economic system we will find it combines socialist and capitalist systems. This system could lead to the total collapse of the society's main infrastructure. Then there is the issue of prosperity and production. If there is no production there would be no prosperity. The problem arose when people were paid when they did not work for it or received payment illegally.

Moreover, the Third World should have its own economic common market. All differences among Arabs should be eliminated so there can be a general framework for dealings among Muslims. The populations of Sudan and Egypt are half the entire Arab population. Everyone in the labor force can contribute provided we get rid of the saying: We cannot survive without the United States. Before that we used to say: We cannot live without the USSR. We say we do not want this or that. Was Egypt on the brink of death before the two superpowers came into existence? I say: Of course not. We must trust in God.

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CSO: 4500/74

TEN COTTON COMPANIES POST LOSSES: TWO REPORT PROFIT

JN130908 Cairo AL-JUMHURIYAH in Arabic 11 Mar 87 p 4

[Excerpts] Ten cotton ginning and export companies have posted losses totaling 100 million pounds while only two companies--the Misr Cotton Export Company and the Egyptian Cotton Pressing Company--have made profits of 2 million pounds. The above was announced during a meeting of the General Assemblies of Cotton Companies chaired by Economy and Foreign Trade Minister Yusri Mustafa to discuss the budgets and final accounts of 12 cotton ginning and export companies. The minister asked the chairmen of the companies to strive to avoid losses next year.

As of 30 June 1986 the Arab Cotton Ginning Company had losses of 8.7 million pounds compared with 6.1 million pounds last year.

The General Assembly of the Misr Cotton Ginning Company chaired by Samir Sami, chairman of the Cotton Board, discussed the company's losses which totaled 11 million pounds. The General Assembly also discussed overdrafts which totaled 1.7 million pounds compared with 2 million pounds last year.

The al-Nil Cotton Ginning Company had losses of 14.5 million pounds compared with 11 million pounds last year. The losses of the al-Wadi Cotton Export Company totaled 8 million pounds compared with 5.5 million pounds last year. The company also owes banks 369,986 pounds in interest.

Installments owed by the Delta Cotton Ginning Company to the banks totaled 1.2 million pounds. The company built two ginning factories in Shirbin and Kafr al-Dawwar but they have not been used economically so far. The Central Auditing Bureau asked for the formation of a committee to study the ginning capacity of the factories and ways of tackling the company's economic situation.

The losses of the Alexandria Commercial Cotton Company totaled 1.206 million pounds. According to the report of the Central Auditing Bureau, the company imported 10,000 bales of American cotton, and the price was calculated on the basis of the Egyptian pound's competitive rate while it was sold on the basis of a different rate, thus entailing a loss. The quarter which will bear responsibility for the deal has not been identified.

The Port Said Cotton Exporting Company sustained losses of 996,000 pounds compared with a surplus of 1.203 million pounds [in the previous year]. The Cotton Export Shareholding Company sustained a loss of 9.136 million pounds while the main center [not further identified] made an 8 million pound profit. The Misr Cotton Export Company has achieved a surplus of 1.3 million pounds. According to the report of the Central Auditing Bureau the company's allocations to meet commitments are insufficient.

The Egyptian Cotton Pressing Company made a profit of 686,000 pounds compared with a projection of 2.5 million pounds. According to the Central Auditing Bureau, the company exceeded investment expenditures and did not pay the state's share of profit, adding that its allocations to meet commitments are adequate.

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CSO: 4500/74

BRIEFS

SOVIET COAL AGREEMENT--Cairo, 14 Mar (MENA)--The Soviet Union will extend to Egypt a 25 million sterling pounds to set up the fourth battery for manufacturing coke coal. The project will be carried out in 3 years and will produce 600,000 tons of coal worth 60 rpt 60 million dollars yearly, chairman of the Board of Directors of the Coke and Chemicals Company said, adding that this production will enable Egypt to export the surplus coke to several European countries. [Text] [Cairo MENA in English 1653 GMT 14 Mar 87] /9604

CERAMICS AGREEMENT SIGNED--Cairo, 15 Mar (MENA)--Two new industrial agreements with the Soviet Union were signed today. One concerns the coke coal industry, and the second relates to Soviet participation in the expansion of the thermal industry. Under the terms of the second agreement, production of ceramics for furnace linings for the iron, steel, cement, and glass industries will reach 56,000 tons. Total investment in the ceramics project will amount to 26 million Egyptian pounds, 22 million of which will be allocated to equipment. [Summary] [Cairo MENA in Arabic 1215 GMT 15 Mar 87] /9604

TRADE AGREEMENT WITH UGANDA--Cairo, 12 Mar (MFNA)--Egypt and Uganda signed a protocol for trade exchange today which provides for an exchange of goods amounting to \$20 million, that is, \$10 million for each country. Egypt will export medicines, textiles, tires, wet-cell batteries, leather goods, gas ovens, phosphate rock, table salt, and light bulbs to Uganda, and import raw and tanned leather, lumber, tea, sesame, cocoa, and millet from it. [Summary] [Cairo MENA in Arabic 1600 GMT 12 Mar 87] /9604

U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION VOTE--Cairo, 12 Mar (MENA)--The newspaper AL-AKHBAR has denounced a negative vote by the United States on a UN Human Rights Commission resolution. The commission adopted the resolution by a vote of 16 to 1; the dissenting vote being that of the United States. In Friday's edition the newspaper says that the resolution condemned Israel's hostile practices in southern Lebanon and its vicious and repeated strikes against Lebanese resistance forces. The newspaper asserts that UN resolutions do not meet with a response within Israel and that Israeli actions against residents of southern Lebanon will not stop. The newspaper asks how long the United States will continue to side with Israel. [Text] [Cairo MENA in Arabic 2140 GMT 12 Mar 87] /9604

1986 OIL OUTPUT, CONSUMPTION LEVELS--Cairo, 5 Mar (MENA)—The Egyptian General Authority for Petroleum today announced that Egypt's output of crude oil totaled 40.237 million tons last year. Natural gas products amounted to 5.200 million tons during the same period. According to a report prepared by the petroleum authority, last year's local consumption of various oil-related products was 16.925 million tons. The report notes that total investment in the oil sector amounted to 416.862 million pounds in 1986. Out of this total, 104.455 million pounds went to research and development, 180.017 million to refining and manufacturing, and the balance to transport and distribution. [Text] [Cairo MENA in Arabic 1050 GMT 5 Mar 87] /9604

CSO: 4500/74

PREMIER, WIFE OFFER BROAD DISCUSSION OF CURRENT ISSUES

Cairo AL-MUSAWWAR in Arabic 20 Feb 87 pp 20-22

[Article by Yusuf al-Qa'id: "A Special Day in Al-Sadiq Al-Mahdi's Home: Sarah Al-Mahdi Speaks"]

[Text] This is how we reached his home: we got in a car and told the driver, "We want to go to al-Sadiq al-Mahdi's home." That was Friday, Khartoum seemed to have taken a vacation from Khartoum, and the whole nation appeared to be catching its breath. It had paused briefly to rest. It had grown tired of talk and had exhausted itself with that daily self-renewing feeling of a new era extending over the Sudan.

The driver knew that we were from the north of the valley. He addressed us thus, and did not say "Egypt." The language at that time seemed capable of acquiring its special flavor everywhere. The most beautiful place in the north of the valley, as far as the driver was concerned, was the city of Alexandria, which he started off talking about with a degree of affection I had detected only in the writings of men who had visited the city, as well as Durrell's famous masterpiece, his novel "The Alexandria Quartet." The driver considered the idea of going to the building of the Council of Ministers to be far-fetched, as the day was a holiday.

He decided to take us to the al-Ummah Party building. The previous day, the minister of information and culture, Muhammad Tawfiq Ahmad, had told us that Mr Sadiq was ill and that he had even disconnected his secret private telephone, whose numbers only the ministers and senior men in his party knew. A Sudanese friend then advised us to go to his home without a prior appointment, take breakfast with him and talk.

The Party and the Home

The party building was closed. It is a massive building the party bought recently from an Egyptian businessman who had been living in the Sudan for years. Across from the party was a small rest house where al-Sadiq al-Mahdi devoted himself to intense activity at times. Our colleague Yusuf al-Sharif, the journalist who had become an expert in the affairs of the Sudan, got down and knocked more than once on the door of the rest house without any response.

We then went to al-Sadiq al-Mahdi's home. At the door to the home were four Sudanese youths wearing civilian clothes with communications equipment in hand. Before the house was a single vehicle, a microbus. The guards returned. The doctor treating al-Sadiq al-Mahdi was with them. He said that he was sick and could not receive us. Before we went off to go back to the hotel which looked out over the same Nile -- that permanent traveler in time, before it debouches into the Mediterranean -- a moment before we went off, someone came and invited us to go in.

In the garden of the home was a black Mercedes car, and a number of men were taking breakfast in a spot of shade spread out over the extensive area of the garden.

The three of us went up -- the thinker and artist Muhammad 'Awdah, our colleague who knows the Sudan as he knows the palm of his hand, and the writer of these lines. They had us sit in the room of the library, in the second, top floor of the house.

I was especially happy because the expansive room we were sitting in consisted of a living room and a dining room, each open to the other, and the shelves of a great library. I later learned from Mrs Sarah al-Mahdi that it was one of the three libraries al-Sadiq al-Mahdi owned.

The Key to the House

The library is the true key to the house and the open pathway to the personality of its owner. Until Sarah al-Mahdi, al-Sadiq al-Mahdi's wife and secretary of the al-Ummah Party, appeared in our presence (and by the way she does not as much like to be called the wife of al-Sadiq al-Mahdi as the party secretary -- she is specifically one of five secretaries of the party throughout the entire Sudan and is the person in charge of women and young people in the party):

I went about in the library until she came. There were many volumes of the interpretation of the holy Koran by Muhyi-al-Din Ibn al-'Arabi, the Jurisprudence of the Sunna by al-Sayyid Sabiq, the Great Classes by Ibn Sa'd, al-Tabari's interpretation, the Gentle Features of Signs, the Era of the Prophet, The Lion of the Jungle in the Lore of the Companions by Ibn Kathir, Reflections on the Koran by Dr Hasan Muhammad, Ibn Kathir's interpretation, the interpretation of Ruh al-Bayan by Isma'il Haqqi, al-Bukhari's Correct Traditions, the interpretation of al-Manar and the interpretation of the holy Koran. Each one of these interpretations took up about 30 volumes, and sometimes more.

The English books were in another cupboard: Karl Marx's Capital, Mabro's The Egyptian Economy, Arnold Toynbee's Study of History, the History of Russia by Bernard Pares, the Death of the President (concerning the assassination of John Kennedy) by William Manchester and the Economic Development of Japan by Lockwood.

Then the lady of the house arrived. I asked her about books of literature and she said that there was another library in the house on which work was

underway at present, and all the books were on the floor. She talked about the books that had been in exile during the years of activity against Numayri, which had not yet all returned to the Sudan.

Sarah

The opposition newspapers in the Sudan give her the nickname of the Sudanese Thatcher, and she smiles when she hears this nickname. After a special Sudanese greeting, which makes one feel that he is in his own home, and golden-colored perfumed tea in little cups, she spoke about the press and said, "Clever journalists do not believe governments; they just believe the people. The people are more enduring and more immortal."

Many girls of the family from the al-Mahdi home came in the course of the meeting with her. That is the day of their weekly visit. A number of Sudanese men came for the purpose of giving greetings and salutations and asking about the health of Mr al-Sadiq, which is how they mention his name.

Sarah studied abroad. She speaks English as fluently as she speaks Arabic. When she pauses before a difficult expression in Arabic, she says it in English, which seems to be easier for her sometimes.

She studied sociology and anthropology. During the meeting, Maryam, al-Sadiq al-Mahdi's daughter, came in to us. She is now studying in Amman, Jordan. We asked her about what an independent Sudanese opposition paper had published about her, that is, about Maryam, concerning her difference with her parents over some issues of politics. She denied that she had talked to Sudanese or non-Sudanese papers on such subjects. Maryam is not the only one who is studying in Jordan. 'Abd-al-Rahman, her brother, studied science there and graduated, and now is an officer in the Sudanese armed forces, in the airborne unit. Maryam is now studying medicine in Jordan.

Sarah al-Mahdi talked about prisons at length. She said that she and al-Sadiq had been incarcerated in about 75 prisons, together or separately. She specified some of them: Khartoum prison, the Police Faculty prison in Egypt, the Omdurman prison.

She discussed the period of activity in London as an official in the office of the opposition there and about the generosity of some Egyptian figures and writers toward them during that time which was difficult for them. She talked about the generosity of Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal, saying "Our teacher Haykal," when he received her and spoke with her, and about Ahmad Baha' al-Din (she abbreviated the name "Our teacher Baha'") who passed through London, on his way from America to Egypt, to meet them.

In her view of the Sudan now, the national formula is the only recourse, with respect to party action and government action both. That is the task which comes before all others in coping with the state of fragmentation; the formula of Sudanese national reconciliation is unavoidable. It is necessary to break down the barrier of regionalism and to establish a parallelism "in the nature of a front," from the south to the north and from the east to the west. It is necessary to recognize that in the period of colonialism a state

of discrimination came into being. The south was neglected and the north was neglected. The east was neglected and the west was neglected. There was a state of strange emphasis on the center of the Sudan. The solution now is a comprehensive national program and the elimination of all the grievances in all the areas of the Sudan's regions.

[She said] "The elimination of racist ideology is the first action that is needed now. We have in the political bureau of the party a non-religious person, another Christian one and a third one who is a Sudanese Copt."

Concerning the position regarding Egypt, she said, frankly, "In the past, I had imagined that the Egyptians were arrogant and it was proved to me that that was just a theoretical view, after I had become so close to the Egyptians that I prefer not to go to a summer vacation spot other than Egypt, which is what I do now." When we told her that these feelings were personal, but what about relations between the two countries, she replied that there was no alternative to having equal relations, between one equal and another.

Al-Sadiq and I

Concerning women in the party, Sarah al-Mahdi said that until recently, in all the parties in the Sudan, men represented women in the political bureau. Now, in the political bureau of the al-Ummah Party, five of 50 political bureau members were women.

We came to her relationship with Mr al-Sadiq al-Mahdi. She said, "We are children of the same family. My mother and his father were brother and sister, and my father is his mother's first cousin. Therefore the family link between us is strong. We met and studied with one another in the years of infancy and childhood, and thus began the relationship, which was crowned with the marriage, which took place in 1963."

Three years before al-Sadiq al-Mahdi's premiership, I had asked her when we would see her in Cairo with Mr al-Sadiq. She said that she would not appear with him, because she was not working as Mr al-Sadiq's wife. She would be very happy to come to Egypt in her capacity as secretary of the al-Ummah Party responsible for youth and women in the party; in this case, she would be boundlessly receptive to visiting Egypt.

She spoke about her children. The mother of Maryam said that they had given her offers to study medicine in Egypt, Morocco and Jordan, but Jordan took the initiative of answering immediately, and she enrolled in studies there, because her father was determined, while he was in prison, that she should study medicine, though in an Arab country. She has a daughter named Maryam who is studying in the Faculty of Engineering at Khartoum University now and Tahirah, who is taking the general certificate examinations this year. Muhammad Ahmad is now 10 years old, in addition to 'Abd-al-Rahman, the officer in the army now.

Fraternal Egypt

However, Egypt came and went, was present and absent the length of the session. Sarah al-Mahdi said, "Our relations with Egypt are first and last

relations of destiny, and therefore it is necessary to deal with the subject most seriously and realistically, far removed from all clouds." I asked her, "How can one open new files and burn the old ones, especially in coping with the old complications?" From her fertile memory she produced the legacy of relations between the family of al-Mahdi and Egypt, including both negative and positive features. She paused to consider the bright, positive aspect of this relationship. She said, "The mistake began on the part of Egypt in the time of the khedive, who looked upon us in the Sudan as Egypt's strategic heartland. The view was one of security only, and we are saddened by this and reject it. We are not a southern governorate of Egypt's. We are a sovereign country. What is needed is a degree of justice in the relationship between the two countries." I told her, "But at that distant time there were Egyptian voices which rejected that. Muhammad 'Abduh came to the Sudan, returned and wrote." She went on, "That is true. Indeed, Muhammad 'Abduh attacked all Egyptians who helped the English destroy the Sudanese nation. That has been established and it is to be found in AL-'URWAH AL-WUTHQA. We realize that." When we got to the present time, she said, "There was no equality at all in the agreement Numayri made with al-Sadat between the two parties. Now, after the upheaval, I had hoped, still do hope and will continue to dream that the Egyptian government will be partial to the Sudanese people. In this case, it will be easy for it to gain the sympathies of the Sudanese people. In the forefront of these issues is Numayri." I told her, "Numayri is present in Egypt by request of the revolution. It is not the Egyptians who say this but rather the Sudanese minister of the interior, Mr Ahmad al-Husayn, said it, when Egypt thought of removing him. He asked Egypt that he be kept and that he not leave it." She said, "We had not known this information from the beginning, and now we do. But there is now a new situation in the Sudan, and this situation requires that Numayri be sent from Egypt."

"Sent or delivered?"

"Or delivered. He is free and unrestricted. He goes to the theater and the movies.

"In general, the causes which bring us close to Egypt are greater and stronger than those which separate us. The thing we hate the most passionately is interference in our affairs. Our hearts and minds are in favor of any positive idea, and in my view to have the two peoples come closer together is the first word in any proper relations between the two countries."

The conversation went on longer than it should have, since it was a day off, a day for Sudanese visits among families. This is one of the customs of this unique country.

I told Mrs Sarah, "In the atmosphere of Khartoum there are discussions about a political marriage which might be taking place soon." She answered, laughing:

"Among political leaders."

I told her, "Among the children of political leaders."

I continued, "Marital ties between the son of Dr Hasan al-Turabi, the leader of the Islamic front and guide of the Moslem Brothers, and one of your daughters."

She said, evading an answer, "Among us in the Sudan, talk about marriage means optimism."

Three Meetings

After that, I met al-Sadiq al-Mahdi three times. The first time was when he came in person to inaugurate the general assembly of the Arab Human Rights Organization. He had a cane in hand and wore the Sudanese national garb. The second was in his office in the Council of Ministers, where we sat with him before an important meeting of the Council of Ministers. The third was at a massive dinner party which he held for people participating in the Human Rights Organization meetings, in another rest house which Numayri had built in the palace of the general armed forces command, at a cost of about 10 million Sudanese pounds, in which Numayri lived only 1 month; he then left the Sudan and never returned to it. It appears that al-Sadiq al-Mahdi wanted the people defending human rights to see the last rest house of the man who had violated the rights of all the Sudanese. In spite of the difficult circumstances of the Sudan, the pomp which we noted in actual conditions in the rest house was even beyond the image of Harun al-Rashid and the Thousand and One Nights. Concerning the September laws, he said "They were one of the aspects of a barbaric experience the Sudan went through in the defunct era, and we are intending to review them. However, it is difficult for that to be done with the stroke of a pen, because we have institutions, and no one can eradicate what he wants in the twinkling of an eye. The matter must be subject to study and the submission of a proper alternative before what exists is eliminated. The alternative is now being presented to the Council of Ministers, and the matter will be presented to the constituent assembly for the issuance of further laws. These laws have been harmful to Islam in more than one instance. Indeed, they have violated it in more than one place. Flogging was put in general use in all penalties, and Islamic penalties were applied without testimony. Priority was given to Islamic penalties over the statute, the state security laws were brought in as part of these laws and they were damaging to the independence of the judiciary. These laws did not concern themselves with Islam's position on the issue of apostasy. Almighty glorious God did not impose a worldly punishment on apostasy. Apostasy has been mentioned and found loathesome. The only time where death is relevant with respect to apostasy concerns treason against general order. But the position of religion is that there is no compulsion with respect to religion. These laws distorted religion and justice alike."

Concerning the constitutional convention, He said that all the steps leading to it had been covered, and the Sudan intended to hold it. This conference would enable the current government to eliminate the effects of May and also stipulate that Islamic law and custom are the sources of legislation. In addition, the problem of legislation in the absence of the constituent assembly will be solved, until it is held. In general it is the constitutional convention that will decide the matter ultimately.

Concerning the war in the south, al-Sadiq al-Mahdi considered that it was not a civil war, but the war of the south was a cover for foreign aggression

in terms of financing, training and diplomatic cover. It was not a civil war in any sense but an aggression against the Sudan, even if the aggression had been through the use of a local covering.

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CSO: 4504/149

BRIEFS

'ARAFAT CRITICISM OF UNION--Mr Yasir 'Arafat, chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization, directed severe criticism and violent censure at the current leadership of the Sudanese Federation of Workers because it had abandoned the commitment to have the central council of the Federation of Arab Workers hold its meeting in Khartoum this 10 February. Mr Yasir said that the Sudanese Federation of Workers' current leadership had responded to pressures from some Arab governments, which had expected that the meeting would end with a total condemnation of what was happening to the Palestinians in Lebanon, and he said that this leadership had fallen into the clutches of one specific government, which he actually named. Mr Yasir conveyed this view of his to the delegation of the Federation of Sudanese Writers which had participated in the writers' conference in Algiers. Mr Yasir 'Arafat attended its inauguration and had the Sudanese delegation bring this message and declare it in the Sudan; the delegation returned recently and did declare it in Khartoum. Mr Yasir praised the position of the Sudanese people in general concerning the current ordeal and said that the first signs of solidarity had come from Khartoum. In addition, in another area, the Union of Sudanese Lawyers demanded yesterday that the government define a fixed position on what was happening to the Palestinians at the hands of the AMAL gangs and called on the government to unleash the powers of the Sudanese people to contribute money and blood to help the people besieged in the camps. A union statement yesterday said that silence on what was going on against the Palestinian people in Lebanon was to be considered treason by all standards. [Text] [Khartoum AL-MAYDAN in Arabic 22 Feb 87 p 1]

CSO: 4504/149

TUNISIA

FOREIGN EXCHANGE STATISTICS FOR 1986 RELEASED

Tunis LE TEMPS in French 14 Feb 87 p 3

[Text] The provisional balance of trade exchange for Tunisia for 1986, as established by the National Statistics Institute, reveals a trade deficit of 891 million dinars, since imports came to 2,295,000,000 dinars, while exports totaled 1,404,000,000 dinars, representing a rate of coverage of 61.2 percent. This is down about 2 points from the 1985 rate of coverage (63.1 percent) for imports (2,287,000,000 dinars) and exports (1,442,000,000 dinars). The drop in exports was due to the decline in oil income in 1986, estimated at 44 percent as compared to the preceding year.

On the other hand, exports excluding energy showed an increase in value of 224 million dinars, or 26.7 percent.

There was a slight compensation for this advance thanks to an increase of 128 million dinars, or 6.5 percent, in imports. The increase in exports had the effect of reducing the trade deficit by 96 million dinars and raising the rate of coverage by 19 percent over the level for 1985.

Trade Balance for Food Products

Value in Millions of Dinars	1985		1986		Variation	
	Millions of Dinars	%	Millions of Dinars	%	Millions of Dinars	%
Imports	278.2	12.2	287.1	12.5	+8.9	+3.2
Exports	134.3	9.3	169.2	12.1	+34.9	+26
Balance	-143.9	-	-117.9	-	-26.0	-18.1

The table above shows that in 1986, the deficit in the trade balance for food products dropped by 26 million dinars, or 18.1 percent, from the 1985 figure. This decline in the deficit was due to an increase in exports (+34,900,000 dinars, or 26 percent) which was higher than the increase for imports (+8,900,000 dinars, or 3.2 percent).

The increase in exports was due primarily to fishing products (47,400,000 dinars as compared to 28,800,000 in 1985, or +64.6 percent), olive oil (53,400,000 dinars as compared to 42,800,000, or +24.8 percent), and finally, almonds (8,700,000 dinars in 1986 as compared to 800,000 dinars in 1985, or 11 times as much). These major increases were, moreover, sustained by other

increases in exports of citrus fruits (11,600,000 dinars as compared to 10,300,000) and canned fruits and vegetables (2,700,000 dinars as compared to 1,800,000).

Where agro-food imports are concerned, substantial increases, in particular in quantity, were seen for grains and vegetable oils. The quantity of grains was up 80 percent (1,310,000,000 tons as compared to 731,600,000 tons), while the increase for oils was 23.7 percent (114,700,000 tons as compared to 92,700,000), despite a drop in the prices for these products.

With regard to other products, including coffee and yeasts, imports increased in value, with volume remaining the same as in 1985. This was particularly true for coffee and pepper (with a total value of about 12,900,000 dinars as compared to 9,300,000 in 1985). Only for sugar did the quantity imported increase by 11.8 percent (186,100,000 tons as compared to 166,400,000), while the price rose by 30 percent (27,100,000 dinars as compared to 20,700,000 in 1985).

Raw Materials and Semi-Processed Products

Value in Millions of Dinars	1985		1986		Variation	
	Millions of Dinars	%	Millions of Dinars	%	Millions of Dinars	%
Imports	744.6	32.6	818.0	35.6	+73.4	+9.9
Exports	336.0	23.3	392.6	28	+56.6	+16.5
Balance	-408.6	48.4	-425.4	47.7	+16.8	+4.1

This table shows that the deficit in the trade balance for raw materials and semi-processed products, which accounted for 48 percent of the overall balance, increased by 4.1 percent between 1985 and 1986.

Imports in this group increased in volume by about 10 percent over the preceding year. As to exports of raw materials and semi-processed products, the increase in value was 17 percent, bringing their contribution to the total value of exports to 28 percent in 1986, as compared to 23.3 percent in 1985. In the import category, significant increases were seen for sulfur, chemical products, soybean meal, timber, plastics, semi-processed metallurgical products, bearings, valves and fittings. There was, however, a decline for some products such as tobacco, cotton fiber, lubricants, thread and woven textiles, paper and cardboard.

The increase in value of 16.9 percent for exports in the raw materials and semi-processed products category was the result of increases for the majority of the phosphated chemical products, as well as fluorides. However, the majority of the phosphated products, including natural phosphate and phosphoric acid, suffered a drop in price, in some cases exceeding 10 percent.

The coverage maintained by equipment imports, which accounted for 22 percent of the total import value, remained roughly at the earlier level, with a slight increase (+0.7 percent). A detailed examination shows more or less major quantitative declines, in general, with the exception of some categories in which the quantities increased, such as telecommunications and scientific equipment.

Equipment Goods

Value in Millions of Dinars	1985		1986		Variation	
	Millions of Dinars	%	Millions of Dinars	%	Millions of Dinars	%
Imports	503.2	22	507.0	22.1	+3.8	+0.7
Exports	39.9	2.8	47.6	3.4	+7.7	+19.3
Balance	-463.3	"	"459.4	"	"3.9	"0.8

Exports of equipment goods showed a major increase (19.3 percent), which increased their relative contribution to the export total from 2.8 percent in 1985 to 3.4 percent in 1986.

Nonfood Consumer Goods

Value in Millions of Dinars	1985		1986		Variation	
	Millions of Dinars	%	Millions of Dinars	%	Millions of Dinars	%
Imports	452.6	19.8	495.2	21.6	+42.6	+9.4
Exports	329.3	22.8	454.5	32.4	+125.2	+38.0
Balance	-123.3	-	40.7	-	-	-67.0

In 1986, with a turnover total of 454,500,000 dinars, exports of nonfood consumer goods showed an increase of 125,200,000 dinars (38 percent) over the 1985 level, thus increasing their contribution from 22.8 percent the preceding year to 32.4 percent. Despite the increase of 9.4 percent in imports, the substantial increase in exports made it possible to absorb 67 percent of the deficit for this group of products (40,700,000 dinars in 1986 as compared to 123,300,000 dinars in 1985). This increase was due in particular to the textile sector, which accounted for more than 82 percent of the value of exports in this category. This item alone showed an increase of 36 percent in exports, from 273 million dinars in 1985 to 373 million dinars in 1986, while imports in this sector increased from 274,500,000 dinars in 1985 to 340,900,000 dinars in 1986, up 66 million dinars, or 24 percent.

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CSO:4519/77

EXTENT OF UNEMPLOYMENT, POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS DISCUSSED

Tunis LE TEMPS in French 11 Feb 87 p 3

[Article by Tijani Harrar]

[Text] Almost all societies are characterized by a major demand from labor--guaranteed jobs.

The Tunisian public has clearly become aware that unemployment is socially and economically harmful. It leads to a decline in, indeed the loss of, resources for the families it affects, and it sows discontent and worry and pushes people to despair, while the economy of the country is diminished because of the lack of human resources which, if employed, would make it possible to produce more.

The permanent nature of unemployment continues to provoke lengthy debates, to the point of anguish, and it challenges the principles of our social organization.

An Assessment

The economic and social assessment undertaken with a view to the recovery program brought out not only the temporary difficulties, but also the structural problems in the Tunisian economy.

Mention should be made first of all of the decline in our energy resources, the bill for which will impose an ever heavier burden on our balance of payments.

The employment issue is a serious worry to the public authorities, since the final estimate of the additional demand for new jobs brings the total for the Seventh Plan to 350,000, to which it will indeed be necessary to add the 300,000 demands for new jobs not yet met as of the present. The great difficulty in the employment sector in Tunisia remains jobs for unskilled workers, who are very difficult to retrain, and for young people entering the job market without education in a school institution. Thus the number of young unemployed persons between 18 and 26 remains very high, accounting for more than 60 percent of all those unemployed.

It has been proven that several thousand graduates of the higher, secondary, technical and vocational schools are unemployed. Our specialists leave the country in search of substantial salaries. This rate--that for young people of working age--remains much too high, and is further developing with the end of the immigration of Tunisian workers.

Similarly, the demographic pressure remains great. Despite the effort made in the family-planning sector, the birth rate is still running between 2.5 and 2.6 percent.

Creating Jobs

We rely heavily on the generosity of agriculture to guarantee the creation of some of the jobs. The state for its part is devoting 20 percent of the national investments to this end, representing an allocation 2,150,000,000 dinars, with an annual rate of growth of 6 percent, as compared to 16 percent of the volume of the investments under the Sixth Plan, for an average growth rate of 7.1 percent (2.3 percent for the year 1985).

The allocation includes 1.9 billion dinars for the manufacturing industries, for a growth rate of 6 percent; 1.75 billion for tourism and services; and 4.9 billion for equipment, including 1.6 billion for housing. The total investment allocation is estimated at 10,700,000,000,000 denars, as compared to 8,200,000,000,000 for the Sixth Plan.

The observations made during the last two job and unemployment surveys in Tunisia brought out the fact that unemployment is a chronic phenomenon. Moreover, various types of unemployment can be distinguished, including marginal unemployment and hidden unemployment. The fact remains that the unemployment problem in Tunisia is the result both of a temporary situation and a structural crisis.

Human Aspects of the Problem

Unemployment always strikes those in our society who are economically weakest, the young and those over 50, the unskilled, the handicapped, women, single individuals, and also the heads of families, above all those of rural origin. The victim of unemployment becomes passive, diminished and frustrated at being unable to work. He feels abandoned to his fate by society and has only fatalism to explain it. Unemployment is like a cancer within a society. It must then be combated by every means.

Social Protection

The labor legislation in Tunisia regulates labor conditions, but provides practically no recourse in the event of a rise in unemployment.

The judgments handed down in cases involving labor disputes have no effect for the victims, for whom no material assistance which could help an unemployed worker to meet his needs is available.

Pros and Cons of Unemployment Insurance

In the name of national solidarity, the public authorities must take into consideration the establishment of an unemployment insurance system to which the state, that is to say the national collective, would contribute.

Very obviously, such assistance should be limited in time to between 6 and 9 months, and would only benefit those who have lost their jobs, pending rehiring.

The conversion of our employment offices and the regional employment bureaus should lead to the establishment of a national employment agency to make vocational retraining and job mobility possible.

Full employment is impossible, because it is regarded as an inflationary factor, but on the other hand, by encouraging investments and consumption and increasing public expenditures, excessive unemployment can be avoided. Such a situational policy often conceals the need to examine the unemployment structure. This leads to temporary actions, while no overall therapy becomes functional.

Finally, it is indeed clear that alleviation of the unemployment problem and the reduction of the rate of growth are closely linked. These two goals will make it necessary to eliminate as many as possible of the distortions and the waste which have always characterized the economic cycles in this country.

Measures designed to encourage the employment of young people fall in the category of "specific solutions" for young graduates, who will benefit from a financial premium of between 10,000 and 30,000 dinars to allow them to set up for themselves. This measure pertains to doctors, pharmacists, architects and technicians. An experiment involving the allocation of state land to agronomical engineers and agricultural technicians should be encouraged, and would make it possible to introduce new methods of farm management, production management and farm services.

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CSO:4519/77

AL-SHA'B RAPS AL-ADAD'S 8 MARCH ANNIVERSARY SPEECH

TAl10807 Jerusalem AL-SHA'B in Arabic 9 Mar 87 p 1

[Editorial: "The 'Very Revolutionary' President?!"]

[Text] In the speech he delivered yesterday marking 8 March, the anniversary of the Ba'th party's seizure of the reins of power in Syria, the "very revolutionary" president loosened his tongue and began expounding upon his ruling regime's stands on numerous Arab, Palestinian, and international issues, pointing out that his regime will remain in the liberation trench which opposes imperialism, Zionism, and racism, bearing in mind that his regime is one of the vanguards of national liberation the world over!

When his excellency, the "very lion" president [pun on Al-adad's name meaning lion in Arabic], talks about his support for international liberation movements and his resistance to the U.S. and Israeli schemes and plans, this sounds like more than a discrepancy because the map of his regime's tendencies and political plans, which are eliciting the complete approval of the United States and Israel, utterly contradict the fiery and revolutionary words which spewed from his mouth and which greeted with lengthy applause by his ruling band and stooges.

We would have been willing to believe the president and pat him on the back as an expression of support had his deeds really tallied with his words and had he left us even the smallest leeway to believe that his nationalistic attitudes oppose imperialism and support liberation movements.

For it is not logical that his excellency, the "very nationalistic" president, should discourse about facing up to the U.S. and Israeli plans and schemes at a time when his regime continues to adopt anti-PLO stances.

Furthermore, his excellency the president's remarks about manning the anti-imperialistic trench, supporting liberation movements, and closing ranks in the face of the U.S. schemes do not tally with the fact that his regime is driving wedges between and fragmenting the nationalist, Lebanese, and Palestinian ranks.

It is clear that with his fall into the swamp of the partition plans being implemented with U.S. and Israeli consent and with complete Arab silence,

his excellency the president has renounced his party's principles and has dragged Syria's national and pan-Arab past down into the mire of hateful sectarianism.

If the "lion" president is a nationalist and a pan-Arab who opposes U.S. schemes and supports national liberation movements, how can he explain to us his blows against the nationalistic masses, his persecution of the Lebanese national forces, and his insistence on stifling any nationalistic breath in the Lebanese arena at a time when these forces are manning the very anti-imperialistic trench that the president claims his regime is manning?

His excellency the president should realize that his stance toward the Palestinian problem and toward the trials and tribulations of our people in the Palestinian camps in Lebanon is the true barometer which will measure the credibility of the pan-Arab and revolutionary slogans that he utters.

Hence...the Syrian regime is required to prove the credibility of its slogans by putting an end to its blows against our people in Lebanon, by lifting the siege imposed on them, and by dealing with the PLO on a basis of equality, respect, and nonintervention in Palestinian affairs.

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CSO: 4400/171

IMF RECOMMENDATIONS ON WAGES, TAX REFORMS

Warning Against Wage Increases

TA091445 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1400 GMT 9 Mar 87

[Text] The IMF delegation has warned Israel that if there are pay raises and if the budget is enlarged, Israeli economic stability will collapse. The members of the delegation conferred with the finance minister and expressed satisfaction with the achievements made over the past 12 months and the planned tax and capital market reforms.

Our correspondent Me'ir Einstein reports that Minister Nisim told the members of the IMF delegation that salary increases will only be paid if productivity grows.

No Delay in Tax Reforms

TA121459 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1400 GMT 12 Mar 87

[Text] The finance minister has said that he has no intention of delaying the implementation of tax reforms due to the IMF's recommendations, although he is prepared to contemplate slight changes in the proposed reform on income tax on condition that the essence of this reform is not affected.

Our economic affairs correspondent Me'ir Einstein points out that possible changes may include a surtax on people whose monthly income exceeds 6,000 shekels, rather than on those whose income exceeds 9,000 shekels, as was suggested in the original proposal. Tax brackets may also be amended so as to increase the net wages of people with a medium income.

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CSO: 4400/174

SECOND TELEVISION CHANNEL BROADCASTING VIA SATELLITE

TA171135 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 11 Mar 87 p 2

[Report by Mikha'el Gerti]

[Text] The second television channel experimental broadcasts, which also include live transmission of the Demjanjuk trial, are being transmitted via a communications satellite since yesterday. These broadcasts can be received throughout Israel, in most of Europe, and in part of the Middle East by means of dish antennas.

As far back as 10 years ago plans were made to transmit the broadcasts of every additional Israeli television channel by means of a satellite, and Israel purchased two transponders on the "Intelsat" satellite to this end. The transponders are owned by the Bezeq Co., and are operated by "Afiqay Tiqshoret" ("Communications Channels"), another government company. The transponders are directed toward Israel, and are intended to serve as a cheaper and better quality alternative to the surface transmission network used for the first television channel. The main reason for using the satellite is the congestion on the usual transmission frequencies used by the first channel or by neighboring countries.

As part of the first stage, two small broadcasting stations (each of 100 W power) are now being installed for the first channel in Beersheba and 'Akko. They will receive the broadcasts reflected from the satellite, and will transmit them to the Haifa area, the western Galilee, and the Beersheba region. The stations being established are in fact existing stations which had not been in use. These stations were purchased 4 years ago by the Bezeq Co., which had planned to install them in Lebanon and use them for the transmission of Israeli television broadcasts to IDF soldiers in the Lebanese region and the Al-biqa'.

The use of satellite broadcasts, which as said began yesterday, will also allow for direct reception by means of small dish antennas (of 2.40 meters or 1.80 meters in diameter), similar to the reception of satellite broadcasts from Luxembourg.

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CSO: 4400/174

ANSAR-II INMATES COMPLAIN OF MALTREATMENT

TA151018 Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 15 Mar 87 p 2

[Report by Joel Greenberg]

[Text] Inmates at a recently reopened IDF detention camp in the Gaza Strip say they are being beaten and humiliated by prison guards, denied daily walks outside their cells and deprived of food and minimal hygienic conditions.

The complaints were made on Friday by a group of prisoners at the Gaza military court to lawyer Felicia Langer, who passed on their charges in a letter to Defence Minister Rabin and Attorney-General Yosef Harish.

Langer said that conditions at the camp, dubbed "Ansar II," violated the Geneva Convention, and that she would apply to the High Court of Justice if treatment at the detention centre was not improved. She said conditions there should be the same as in Israeli jails, or the camp should be dismantled.

An IDF spokesman said last night he could not yet respond to the charges.

The camp holds the youths arrested last month during a wave of disturbances in the Gaza Strip. It had been closed down in December following complaints of maltreatment.

Detainees made the following allegations on Friday:

-- Military and Border Police occasionally beat detainees without reason, and humiliated, provoked and cursed them. One guard recently kicked a detainee in the face and the leg.

-- Prisoners, some of whom are as young as 13, are denied daily walks outside their cells and are kept idle without access to newspapers, radios, books, or writing material.

-- Inmates are kept at the camp for open-ended periods and denied family visits. Though the camp is meant only to hold inmates until their trial, some are in fact returned to the camp after sentencing.

-- Prisoners are not given adequate opportunities to wash and change clothes; one inmate waited 20 days until he was allowed to shower.

-- Prisoners are given insufficient food and medical care and are allowed to use the bathroom only twice a day.

-- Two mattresses are distributed to every three prisoners. They also received insufficient blankets and complain of the humidity and cold.

During an IDF press tour of the camp last month, two prisoners who were brought to reporters by prison guards said they had no complaint of maltreatment, though they did mention a shortage of food.

A top military police officer at the scene said that guards acted with maximal restraint--and that inmates were allowed out of the cells daily, showered twice a week, and received changes of underclothing as well as enough blankets and food.

The officer conceded that prisoners were denied family visits and held for open-ended periods, but said they were only being held for questioning pending trial. The officer said the youngest prisoners were 14.

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CSO: 4400/174

BRIEFS

ENEMY PLANE DETECTION SYSTEM--An Israeli-made system which increases the range of radars mounted on surface-to-air missile batteries and enables the absolute identification of enemy planes is being unveiled today. The system, "Super Eye," was developed by the Israeli company "(Aran) Electronics" and is installed in the radar systems of Hawk missiles. It enables the detection of planes at a distance of 35 to 40 km and positive identification of planes 17 to 20 km away. [Text] [Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 9 Mar 87 p 1] /9599

CSO: 4400/174

COLUMNIST DOUBTS U.S.-ISRAELI TENSION OVER POLLARD

JN121025 Amman AL-RA'Y in Arabic 12 Mar 87 p 24

[Article by political editor: "The Pollard Model"]

[Text] It is a lie to say that relations are tense between Washington and Tel Aviv. The proof is the superciliousness with which the Israelis view the case of spy Jonathan Pollard. What tension is this that makes Washington ask Tel Aviv's permission to sell limited defensive weapons to four Arab states?

The Israelis have "cooperated" with the investigation into the Pollard case by giving written information which later proved to be totally untrue. Also in the week in which the Pollard was sentenced, the Israelis promoted the Air Force colonel who recruited Pollard, to the rank of general. The other colonel who took part in the recruiting was transferred from the Army and appointed manager of a big military factory. This is after the two colonels have been withdrawn from Washington.

Why not? Shy should Tel Aviv not be supercilious when the U.S. Administration needs the Israeli Government's favor in order to facilitate its task in the U.S. Congress? Should Zionism not be supercilious when it is the key between the legislative and executive authorities in the United States?

After 7 hours of deliberations in the Israeli Government it was decided to form a special commission to investigate the Pollard espionage case. What will result from this commission? What is the relationship between these investigations and the crime which took place in the United States? Has the American court convicted the two important Israeli embassy officials who recruited Pollard for this despicable mission?

Like the American indignation and the so-called tension in relations, the investigation commission formed by the Israeli Government is no more than an attempt to ride the storm which was created by this case in U.S. public circles. Tel Aviv and Washington are exchanging roles in what seems like a conspiracy against U.S. public opinion which denounces this Israeli paradox in a country that gives Israel its daily bread and also weapons for aggression.

Before Pollard there was the sensational Zionist espionage story when the Jew Rosenberg and his wife passed the secrets of the U.S. atomic bomb to the Soviet Union. A wave of false American anger also erupted then, but that did not change anything in U.S.-Israeli relations.

The Pollard case, of which there are hundreds of similar cases in Congress and the administration, is a model which must be understood by us, the Arabs, who are always dreaming of neutralizing the United States and ensuring an even-handed U.S. role in the so-called peaceful resolutions of the conflict. If Washington cannot protect itself from its Zionist ally, how can it protect the interests of its Arab "friends"?

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CSO: 4400/171

AL-DUSTUR ON U.S. ARMS; 'ZIONIST' PRESSURE

JN111226 Amman AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 11 Mar 87 pp 1, 19

[Editorial: "The Price of U.S. Submission to Israel"]

[Text] Israel has begun to instigate its loyalist circles in the United States against a plan through which Washington intends to sell advanced anti-tank rockets and other U.S. weapons to a number of Arab countries, claiming that such weapons would endanger Israel's security. Undoubtedly, such exposed moves by the Zionist pressure groups in the United States are in complete harmony with the Israeli mentality which does not take into consideration any U.S. interest in the Middle East other than the U.S. interest of reinforcing and bolstering the aggressive, expansionist Israeli capability and preventing the Arab countries from obtaining their legitimate defense requirements. Regrettably, the United States, which has always succumbed to such Israeli blackmail, encourages such behavior by these Zionist pressure groups and such impertinent policy of blackmail, especially following the two major Israeli scandals the consequences of which have not yet subsided in the United States itself. Here, we mean the Israeli role in the "Irangate" scandal and the Jonathan Pollard affair whose chapters have not yet been closed.

Thus, one would not be surprised if the Jewish lobby succeeds in halting the rockets deal proposed by the U.S. Administration to some Arab countries. This deal would be like other arms deals which these pressure groups have succeeded in halting during the past few years and in forcing President Reagan to retreat from his declared commitments toward a number of Arab capitals. The United States, which has placed the reins of its Middle East political power in the hands of an aggressive, expansionist state and fanatical Zionist pressure groups which do not respect any U.S. interest in the region, is currently paying the price for this short-sighted policy in the form of successive scandals which have damaged the United States' image among the region's people and eroded all that was left of its political credibility in the Middle East and Europe.

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CSO: 4400/171

COLUMNIST ON 'DESTRUCTIVE EFFECT' OF POLLARD CASE

JN111402 Amman SAWT AL-SHA'B in Arabic 11 Mar 87 p 20

[Article by Sulayman Khayrallah: "The Pollard Case and the Question Posed"]

[Text] It is ridiculous to talk about the negative effects of the Israeli espionage scandal in the United States led by Jonathan Pollard and forget the destructive effects of this scandal of the Arabs.

Jonathan Pollard is one of thousands of spies who have placed themselves at the service of Zionism in the United States. He is in fact a member of an Israeli intelligence circle, which is not merely satisfied with "stealing" U.S. information and secrets for Israel, but also sponsors Israel's political stands and backs Israel with funds, arms, and technology.

The saying that Israel is America's pampered child is not a joke. This child, which has been feeding on the "milk" of greed pouring from the U.S. treasury and arsenal, has now grown up and his ambitions have surpassed those of his loving "mother." He dreams of becoming stronger than her, thereby reversing the situation so that in the long run the United States would become the pampered child of the Zionist entity.

We say it is ridiculous for some people to believe that the Pollard case will affect U.S.-Israeli relations, or the existing strong alliance between Washington and Tel Aviv, or the powerful Zionist lobby in the United States which is already trying to straighten out the case in Israel's interest and to persuade the U.S. Administration to agree to the idea of making the exchange of information official instead of resorting to spies and agents.

The effect of the Pollard case is more serious than what some people believe in view of the fact that it touches the core of the Arab-Israeli conflict. It has had negative effects on the strategic balance of power. These effects have extended to the Iraq-Iran war, Lebanon, and the Israeli military structure.

If Pollard has succeeded in obtaining the keys to U.S. secrets and giving them to Israel, these keys are not far from Israel's long arm in government and Congress lobbies in Washington. This arm has previously reached the U.S. arsenals to supply arms to Iran. The so-called "Irangate" scandal, which is not less serious than the Pollard scandal, and other political scandals are part of the covert and overt activities of this arm.

What is important is what presently concerns us: The effects of these scandals on our nation and its issues and how we can face and cancel them. This is the question.

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CSO: 4400/171

BRIEFS

AMBASSADOR TO CYPRUS--Amman (PETRA)--The Cabinet has decided to appoint Mr Awwad al-Khalidi, currently Jordan's ambassador to Greece, as the kingdom's non-resident ambassador to Cyprus. [Summary] [Amman JORDAN TIMES in English 18 Mar 87 p 1] /9604

OUTGOING JORDANIAN AMBASSADOR--Dr Sa'dun Hammadi, RCC member and National Assembly speaker, today received Jordanian Ambassador in Baghdad Salih al-Kabariti at the end of his term of office in Iraq. They reviewed bilateral relations and ways to promote them. [Text] [Baghdad Voice of the Masses in Arabic 1300 GMT 14 Mar 87] /9604

DANISH AMBASSADOR--Amman (J.T.)--Denmark's non-resident ambassador designate to Jordan Poul Bent Soendergaard on Wednesday handed a copy of his credentials to Foreign Minister Tahir al-Masri. Mr Soendergaard succeeds Mr Niels Tillisch who has become director of a political department at the Danish Foreign Ministry in Copenhagen. [Text] [Amman JORDAN TIMES in English 12 Mar 87 p 1] /9604

OIL AGREEMENT WITH CANADA--A Canadian-Jordanian agreement was signed this evening between Petro Canada International Assistance Cooperation Company and the Jordanian Natural Resources Authority of the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources. Under the terms of the agreement Canada will provide \$19.1 million in technical and geological research aid for the development of Jordan's oil and gas potentials. The 2-year agreement was signed by the Minister of Energy Dr Hisham al-Khatib and the chairman of the Canadian company, Mr Peter (Tow). [Excerpt] [Amman Television Service in English 2000 GMT 11 Mar 87] /9604

CSO: 4400/171

U.A., GULF STATES, USSR ENCOURAGE SUMMIT MEETING WITH AL-ASAD

Beirut AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 17 Jan 87 pp 26-28.

[Article by Ghassan Bayram: "Moscow Supported and Washington Blessed the Lebanese-Syrian Talks."]

[Text] There is no disagreement over the Lebanese-Syrian summit; rather there are Israeli attempts to derail any Lebanese-Syrian agreement and to engage the region from Iran to Lebanon in destruction and a scorched earth policy.

Before the second round of talks were to take place between Lebanon and Syria in preparation for the summit meeting of the two presidents Hafiz al-Asad and Amin al-Jumayyil, the Lebanese president sent his personal representative Hani Salam on a tour of the Arab Gulf states, bearing personal letters from President al-Jumayyil to the heads and amirs of the Gulf states. These letters set forth the stages through which the official talks between Beirut and Damascus had gone through, and the atmosphere in which they had taken place.

In the view of observers in the Lebanese capital, this direction taken by the Lebanese president towards the states of the Gulf Cooperation Council has unusual significance and important indications. That is because if this movement means anything, it is:

--That the Lebanese-Syrian talks aimed at bringing the two presidents al-Jumayyil and al-Asad to the point of announcing an agreement solving the Lebanese crisis have made great strides. They have begun to draw near to a conclusion in an atmosphere in which optimism prevails that the meeting between the two presidents will end decisively, and that an announcement of a comprehensive agreement will come out of it.

--That President al-Jumayyil is anxious to keep Arab states, especially those of the Gulf Cooperation Council, informed of official talks going on between Beirut and Damascus, and of the short and long-term goals that the expected summit between the two presidents will aim for.

With these actions, President al-Jumayyil aims at informing these Arab states that they are involved in what goes on with Damascus, since he is anxious that the Gulf Cooperation Council states and others take a supportive position.

These are the states that President al-Jumayyil visited a few months ago, where he had found complete support for his position and his initiatives to solve the Lebanese crisis, for helping Lebanon politically and economically to confront its crisis, and for bringing back its vitality on the basis of political solutions agreed upon by the Lebanese people.

--During his previous tour of certain Arab capitals, particularly the Gulf ones, President al-Jumayyil had sensed a desire among the leaders of these states for a quick end to Lebanon's ordeal. This desire makes it imperative for these states to take a sympathetic and supportive position to help President al-Jumayyil and the legitimate Lebanese authorities meet the obligations imposed on them as a result of the summit meeting between Presidents al-Asad and al-Jumayyil. This is especially in regards to extending the state's temporal authority, and bringing back Lebanon's sovereignty and independence by ending the role and presence of non-legitimate armed forces including the Palestinian ones, and setting up a just state capable of protecting all sides and groups, because in the end that is the only way that the rights and safety of all can be guaranteed.

Contrary to what some think, that this Arab activity of President al-Jumayyil might upset Syria. The main political figures in Lebanon insist just the opposite, saying that this aspect of the activity that President al-Jumayyil is carrying out is as beneficial for Lebanon as it is for Syria, since what is wanted in the end is a Lebanese-Syrian accord on solving the Lebanese crisis with Arab blessing. A solution to the Lebanese crisis, along the lines of what is being discussed, has come to be an Arab interest. It is fundamentally in the interest of the Arabs for many reasons. One of them relates to Arab national security, and another concerns closing a big door in the face of international and Israeli currents and plots which today rage in the region and threaten all Arabs.

Perhaps of all the Arab states, the Gulf Cooperation Council is currently the one who best understands the need to put out the flames of the Lebanese crisis. This crisis, with its serious and complicated new developments and interferences, add to the serious dangers that threaten the security and independence of the Arab Gulf states because of the continuation of the Iraq-Iran war that has been raging for some 7 years. The Arab states have tasted much bitterness from the crisis, to the point that the economic and political powers and capabilities of these states have been exhausted, and it has distracted them from many crucial national concerns.

Thus the careful and well-studied preparations for the twelfth Lebanese-Syrian summit will end up differently from previous summits--they are evidence of a common desire to give the utmost potential for the success of this summit. The role of the two leaders may be no more than to announce an agreement, the basics and semi-official formulae of which will have been reached in talks between the Syrian and Lebanese working teams. An agreement was reached on the basis of a semi-formal formula. The first round of talks has begun between the Lebanese working team which President Amin al-Jumayyil had formed consisting of his former foreign minister and foreign affairs adviser Dr Elie Salam, his personal envoy Mr Hani Salam, and the director of intelligence in the Lebanese army Colonel Simon Qassis on the one hand, and the Syrian working team, which President al-Asad had formed consisting of his foreign

minister Mr Faruq al-Shara', and the man in charge of Syrian intelligence in Lebanon, Brigadier General Ghazi Kan'an.

The first round of talks began in an atmosphere of political uncertainty which raised many doubts that a summit could be held, or that it would be successful.

And in fact, the first round of talks did take place. They centered on a working paper sent by President al-Jumayyil to President Hafiz al-Asad, in which he clearly laid out his views on the political and national solution to the Lebanese crisis, and on the special relationship between Syria and Lebanon.

In light of the impressions that the Syrian capital formed about the positions of national and Islamic Lebanese leaders from President al-Jumayyil's total concept, [it seemed that] these positions did not believe that the working paper would satisfy the hopes and ambitions of these leaders with respect to political reform and the role of Lebanese political and factions in power-sharing. Therefore the impression arose that the Syrian working party expressed great reservations towards al-Jumayyil's working paper during the first meeting that was held in Damascus.

The Syrian side informed the Lebanese team of its observations regarding the working paper: that it was totally unclear on political reform, especially with regard to the nature of the national solution and the rights of factions.

The Syrian team said that if this working paper could not reach a definite and absolute decision of the subject of abrogating political sectarianism and linking it to a period or specific time schedule, it should at least result in making the presidency of the republic rotational, and not remain the monopoly of one group.

When the Lebanese side expressed reservations toward these demands, which the Syrian side believed represented the view of a large segment of the Lebanese, Dr Mustafa al-Haj 'Ali, director of the office of Vice President 'Abd-al-Halim Khaddam, reported, whereupon the Syrian said: "The matter needs to be reviewed and further clarified. If you are against abrogating political sectarianism and against the principle of making the first presidency rotate between the main sects, then it will be necessary for President al-Jumayyil to define to us his concept of power sharing, and on what basis this sharing would be accomplished."

At one time some of the opposition groups believed that the president of the republic would bear responsibility for the failure of the summit or of its not being held, and that he still held to the Maronite theory that Lebanon was based upon fixed principles, according to which the Maronites and Christians should keep the privileges they had enjoyed for decades.

In the midst of a political campaign that began to point the finger of blame at the Ba'abda Palace, President al-Jumayyil was experiencing other things that ensured that the summit would be held that it would inevitably be successful and that whatever the different viewpoints with Damascus on the subject of a Lebanese political solution, they would dissolve in the end. The information

that he has makes him sure of all that, for reasons that in many cases go beyond internal Lebanese affairs to crucial regional issues, issues that force the Syrian negotiators to confront a more serious battle in which many strategies will clash, and in which the fate of the region and its people will be decided for many decades to come.

For everything these days is taking place at the level of the entire region; it is as if there were a process to sift and settle upon the essential options, currents, and plans, including:

First: The plan of those who so-called Arab moderates, foremost of whom these days is PLO leader Mr Yasir 'Arafat. This plan accepts the principle of negotiating and making peace with Israel on the basis of deciding the West Bank and Gaza and establishing Palestinian national authority within the framework of a solution that would set up a federal union with Jordan. This is what Shimon had agreed to in principle during the last days of his power following the meetings which he held with the Egyptian president Husni Mubarak and the Moroccan monarch Hasan II.

Secondly: The plan of the ruling Israeli Likud bloc, which still insists that what was decided upon at Camp David is everything, and that there is no need for any new agreements.

This stance sanctions the Likud's course of following a scorched earth policy, and of working towards turning the region of the northeastern front from Iran to Lebanon into a region of exploding volcanoes.

This course, on the basis of which the ruling Likud in Israel has begun to act and which it has begun to adhere to, has again reminded one of what Brezinski, national security adviser of former American president Carter (1979), used to say and mean about what he called the "Arc of Crises."

Third: President Hafiz al-Asad's plan, which calls for preparedness for a decisive Arab war against Israel that would force it to agree to and accept the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, and to withdraw from occupied Arab lands. The basis of all that is working towards achieving a strategic balance with the Israeli enemy.

Therefore, whatever goes on within the framework of the talks in preparation for the Lebanese-Syrian summit goes on within the context of two fundamental gambles.

The first gamble is President Amin al-Jumayyil's gamble that if the important and fundamental solution to the Lebanese crisis is not brought about by President al-Asad, then it will not be possible for anyone else to impose a solution. Because of President al-Asad's capabilities and the clout that he has, he is the only one able to solve the Lebanese crisis; moreover, it was the Syrian president who has been able to elevate Syria to the ranks of national and Arab leadership, and he has tried and is still trying to extinguish the sparks of factional partition in Lebanon, since he is well aware of the seriousness of this plan, which wants to use the partitioning of Lebanon as a means of dividing up Syria and the Arab world.

The second gamble involves the dangers of division and fragmentation which threaten the Arab world. It is a gamble made by both Presidents al-Asad and al-Jumayyil that the success of this summit will most certainly not mean a victory for Amin al-Jumayyil, or the lack of a victory for somebody else. Rather it will be a summit challenging what threatens Lebanon and confronts Syria, and thus it will be to save the entire region, in spite of itself.

On this basis, the actual and important behind-the-scenes activities to the current preparatory talks all point to a single Syrian and Lebanese conviction, which will ensure that the twelfth summit will not be to discuss details, because the challenges are far greater than that. If the internal Lebanese situation takes on great importance during it, that is because it is the way to an agreement between the leaders of the twin countries on confronting these great challenges. Entering into this framework in a special way is the war of the camps, which is still raging in Lebanon, and which has begun to turn into a war of attrition. It is as if it were a second door or gateway to the Iraq-Iran war, and the smoke rising from these two wars is now spreading along this "tunnel" extending from Iran to Lebanon, and has begun to choke the great Arab powers and regimes.

Based on all that, it becomes clear how important the dimensions of the summit between the Syrian and Lebanese leaders are, and how important its success would be. The positive results of its success would not only be limited to bringing the crisis to the point of true resolution, but they would also give the legitimate Lebanese authorities new duties to contain the war of the camps, and to try to impose a solution to stop it and extinguish its fires.

Lebanon had begun to act in advance of the Syrian-Lebanese summit with those contacts between leaders which began with the Gulf Cooperation Council states. It was also preceded by direct contacts with Moscow, through a personal letter which President al-Jumayyil sent to the Soviet leader Gorbachev and to which he received a reply. That was in addition to his contacts on the subject which were brought up with the American administration. These contacts dealt with the state of accord which had begun with Syria, and what agreements might be reached.

According to reliable information, the Soviet position was extremely positive, especially in relation to the subject of the camps, since Moscow stressed the need to reach a political solution. That is what Lebanon is seeking and to which it gives absolute priority, as long as any solution in the end gives the Lebanese Government the power to extend its sovereignty completely.

As for Washington, the same sources of information affirmed that the American administration encouraged and supported the Syrian-Lebanese dialogue. It had officially informed Lebanon, through diplomatic channels, that it had no objection to Lebanon trying to solve its internal problems with Syria by all possible means and in a way that would safeguard the interests of the two countries and preserve the sovereignty and independence of each.

Finally, it remains to be said that the Lebanese working team went to Damascus last Saturday bearing an official clarification to President al-Jumayyil's concept of achieving power sharing among the Lebanese. In connection with that, it is said that this clarification included a very progressive view, which brought an air of satisfaction to the Lebanese and Syrian sides.

To the extent that the various concerned and knowledgeable figures evaluate the importance of this summit in the Lebanese context and with its regional dimensions with respect to the Middle East and the Palestinians, fears increase about the activity of forces complaining about this summit, its agreeing upon a Lebanese solution, and the form of the special relationship between the two countries. There are fears that these forces will begin to use various obstructive means, which in turn have begun to appear in the form of an escalation of the fighting around the camps and the shelling of Beirut Airport in order to paralyze it and shut it down, and prior to that, the assassination attempt against President Kamil Sham'un. That was the second Israeli message which Tel Aviv has sent to the Maronite leaders, following its attempt to set up a sea blockade to cut the sea lane between Juniyah and Larnaca.

In addition, the official Lebanese and Syrian leadership expects an increase in Israeli interference and the participation of other specific parties in the attempt to obstruct this summit or cause it to fail.

Thus the beginnings of the challenge appear.

12547/9869
CSO: 4404/225

BRIEFS

ECONOMY IN FIGURES--Statistical reports have presented some of the figures relating to sectors of the Lebanese economy during a large portion of 1986. In the view of economics experts, these figures have important indications which reveal the strengths and weaknesses of the Lebanese economy. The most important of the published figures are as follows: --Debts: By the end of last October, the domestic public debt had reached 66.8 billion pounds, an increase of 39.5 percent over the total domestic public debt for 1985. --Deposits: The reports mentioned that Lebanese have \$30 to \$40 billion abroad, of which 8 billion is in American banks. The Lebanese monetary sum is about 210 billion Lebanese pounds. --The cost of the war: The economics expert Dr Nasir al-Sa'idi estimated the cost of the Lebanese war at 550 billion pounds, and the cost of rebuilding at 240 billion pounds. --The value of the pound: The exchange rate of the pound was around 18.10 pounds to the dollar at the end of 1985, and by the middle of last November that rate had come to be around 65 pounds to the dollar; in other words, up to that date the pound had lost 261 percent of its value in 11 months. --Imports: imports for 1986 are valued at 1.1 billion dollars, half of which went to pay for oil. --Exports: The volume of industrial exports up to the end of last September is valued at 2.5 billion pounds. It should be kept in mind that the figures are increasing in such a way that might lead to the adjustment of both exports and imports in the near future. [Text] [London AL-TADAMUN in Arabic 17-23 Jan 87 p 34] 12547/9869

CSO: 4404/225

SUPPLY MINISTER DISCUSSES EFFORTS TO CONTROL PRICES

Damascus TISHRIN in Arabic 16 Feb 87 p 4

[Interview with Riyadh al-Hajj Khalil by 'Izz-al-Din Nabulsi: "Tight Control Campaign Aimed at Closing Gap Between Fixed and Unregulated Prices"; presumably in Damascus, date not specified]

[Text] A short time ago a massive control campaign got underway in commercial markets and businesses throughout the country, Damascus in particular.

The Ministry of Supply and Domestic Trade has committed large groups of personnel, vehicles and radio communications to the Damascus markets to join supply control personnel from the department of supplies in Damascus.

To learn about the motives and objectives of this campaign, TISHRIN met with Mr Riyadh al-Hajj Khalil, minister of supply and domestic trade. Following is the text of the interview:

[Question] What are the reasons the recent supply campaign launched by the Ministry of Supply?

[Answer] Actually, what has been going on will continue into the future. It is an intensification of the supply control process necessitated by the spontaneous rise in market prices. This is not a casual short-lived operation, but is here to stay.

We have committed to this campaign new capabilities in the field of supply control, for we have discerned an urgent need for such intervention, be it in the city of Damascus or in the country's various cities and provinces. I think that this measure has given initial results we deem quite satisfactory, even though we feel that the upshot of such measures is to arrive at a fixed price and stability in the market to prevent exploitation of consumers without cheating manufacturers and retailers.

[Question] What, in your estimation, are the factors that contributed to the implementation and success of this step and how long will it last?

[Answer] I believe that the success of this step is the responsibility of everyone alike--citizens, consumers and the ministry that is in charge of achieving the goals for which it was created. It is natural that this should be a basic function of the Ministry of Supply because, first, its duty is to secure ample supplies of commodities in accordance with the country's available economic capabilities; second, it is the ministry's responsibility to guarantee price stability in the market whereby both buyers and sellers are aware of the regulated fixed price to be observed; and third, we must implement tight control on the supply market with a view to stabilizing prices in the interest of the consumer. The boost given to supply controls in terms of improvements, support and channeling of energies will continue. Our sizeable presence in the markets will continue not to establish the largest number of restraints, but to implement and realize fixed prices and decisions in this regard without establishing any restraints, if possible. I do not believe that success is measured by the number of restraints put in place, but rather by achieving a balance in the market between ample supplies and stable prices that enable citizens to meet their needs with ease and peace of mind. This can only be done through cooperation between producer and consumer.

Some time ago we found a great discrepancy in the market between officially-set prices and actual prices dominating the market. This became more manifest in the wake of higher gas prices when merchants raised the price of commodities unlawfully and other merchants followed suit. We had to intervene at the proper time and this was done through cooperation with popular and party organizations and various security agencies, to put a stop to all excesses.

Here I would like to emphasize that we are not going after any particular segment of society because we are concerned about all citizens in all walks of life while particularly paying special attention to consumers. Our intervention is a positive one aimed at protecting everyone against abuse by a few.

We hope that we will not have to take anyone to court and to always find the markets in good and balanced condition.

[Question] Have you provided adequate personnel and tools to cover the entire city?

[Answer] The personnel, vehicles and tools that have been added to the Supply Control Agency are enough to cover the entire city of Damascus. All these capabilities will be dedicated to this job full time and we have other more sophisticated and effective plans for the future. We plan to provide this agency with college-educated personnel able to interact with the public with skill and decorum and to enforce the spirit as well as the letter of the law. We will put this into effect soon.

[Question] It has been noted that the number of violations that have been cited and the businesses that have been closed to date is very high. How do you explain this phenomenon?

[Answer] Unfortunately, some merchants had the mistaken belief that the increase in the price of gasoline would include other commodities, so they automatically raised the prices of some items. When we felt that these merchants were no longer satisfied with the profits set for the items they carry we stepped in to put a stop to this matter.

[Question] What leading activities will this campaign cover and do you intend to apply it to other sectors and when?

[Answer] The supply control has not been confined to a specific field of activity and we have issued open instructions to include and cover all markets and leading activities, be they related to prices or services. Everyone is required to observe the prices set for the various commodities. We are not against any merchant realizing the fixed rate of profit, and those who offer services, be they taxi drivers, restaurant owners or others involved in commercial activities. They have a fixed margin of profit to which they are entitled, but they do not have the right to exceed it. Likewise, citizens should have the feeling that their rights are protected from any encroachment. We support honest work, honest production and fixed profits. But the important and essential thing we need is the cooperation of all citizens so that we may go on with the supply control process in a proper and lasting manner for their own good.

[Question] A group of merchants who produce and sell a high and significant number of food and cleaning products have raised the price of their products several times without checking with the Ministry of Supply. What measures do you plan to take against them?

[Answer] Raising the prices of products manufactured by the private sector without checking with the Ministry of Supply is absolutely prohibited. We have issued instructions and orders forbidding producers from offering or altering the appearance, specifications and prices of their products without the approval of the Ministry of Supply. We, for our part, are obligated to study the production costs submitted by the producers to determine the official price that must be clearly and officially posted for the public to see.

Violators of these measures will be subject to legal action to force them to go back to the real prices and fixed profits.

[Question] The results of this campaign have shown that the element of initiative in reality has a positive and effective impact and that you can exercise your powers any time you want. Why did you fail to fulfill these functions in the past with the same degree of seriousness that we see today?

[Answer] The matter of initiative is alive and well and supply market control is here to stay. But, as I have already said, we felt a need to commit new energies and capabilities necessitated by the objective circumstances of the prices dominating the market. This campaign will go on as long as there is a need for it in order to check the exploitation and fix prices. The thing that has helped our action take on the kind of seriousness to which you referred is citizen cooperation which has had a great effect on the work of the control

agency and a 70 percent effect on the work of supply control. The more cooperation we get from the people the better the results. A propos, I will cite this example: not one of the supply market control centers we set up a while back with a view to establishing our presence among the people and in the main markets has received any complaints, not even minor ones. This is a negative aspect as far as we are concerned that does not allow us to do our work. Moreover, a supply inspector cannot be present at every sale transaction and Damascus has 60 to 70 different activities. No matter how much the supply control cadre is augmented, it cannot cover all these activities or all citizens who are the object of exploitation, if you will.

From now on, these citizens can report to the Supply Control Agency any violations by phone, provided that they give clear and open information. They will find that the agency will do a perfect job and will not be remiss in giving the citizens their due.

[Question] How does the ministry plan to develop work procedures observed by supply control agencies to cover the momentous tasks entrusted to it to achieve equity between the producer or importer and the consuming public?

[Answer] The ministry's plan is based on three factors: product, price and control. All these factors are essential to our work--of this I am certain.

To the same extent we are able to provide good products, market conditions can be stabilized and people can have peace of mind; and to the same extent as prices are fixed and stable within regular limits and in accordance with state regulations, citizens can enjoy stability.

Supply control in this case must be maintained in any intense and serious manner. As for what we have already made available and what we ought to make available, I say that our intervention must be at two levels: expanding retail outlets and expanding the sales through the expansion of outlets available to the people. A few days ago, I issued a directive to the General Consumer Corporation to sell and distribute rationed products to all grocery stores.

There is no need to crowd people into government distribution centers and, therefore, all citizens ought to be able to get what they need easily and conveniently from neighborhood grocery stores.

[Question] Reports are being circulated among the public to the effect that the price of butter, bread and other products will go up. How true are these reports?

[Answer] We have no intention to change the price of any of the commodities you mentioned or any other basic food commodity in the near future. All these reports are mere rumors spread by some in an effort to charge higher prices and realize higher profits. These rumors are groundless and we hope that people will defend themselves and their rights by rejecting extortion and exploitation and by assisting our control agencies by reporting, even from afar, discrepancies, abuses and exploitation anywhere in the country. We will

also hear any complaints by any citizen, even against control patrols that may be negligent in the performance of their duty and we will not fail to bring to account any derelict employee or any offender in any of these areas.

12502

CSO: 4404/266

WATER SHORTAGE IN TA'IZZ NECESSITATES CONSERVATION

Ta'izz AL-JUMHURIYAH in Arabic 12 Feb 87 p 5

[Article by 'Abduh Sallam Sa'id: "Water Essential to Life... How Can it be Conserved ... Water Authority Shortages ... Suggests Wastage be Curbed"]

[Text] There have been repeated complaints, by phone or in the mail, to this newspaper over the past few weeks about the water supply being disrupted in a number of the town's neighborhoods. In order to find out about the complaints we had to go to the Water and Sewerage Authority branch office in Ta'izz where we met with Mutahhar al-Nadhir, Branch Manager and his assistant 'Ali 'Abd al-Aziz. The result of this meeting is the following conversation:

[Question] Could our readers know the main reasons which led to the decline in water supplies and scheduling of distribution to the various neighborhoods in town?

[Reply] The main reason is attributable to diminishing productivity of the wells, some of which can no longer produce at the capacity which they used to, while others have dried up altogether. A principal reason for the decrease is that withdrawals exceed the volume of water replenishment due to limited rainfall over the last few years. At the same time we find that well productivity cannot keep up with the town's increasing needs. In comparison, there is increasing building and construction taking place in the town and extension of water supply to new neighborhoods that is far exceeding all expectations. This has created an imbalance of production and supply operations.

Before this situation developed, water supplies remained uninterrupted in all town neighborhoods since the volume of water supply was sufficient to continually meet all needs. Given the latest statistics the Authority was forced to use a distribution system in many of the neighborhoods so that water could be... distributed among the neighborhoods. This new situation is a great nuisance to many consumers particularly those who do not have water tanks to use during the interruption of service, although in previous years they had received their supplies directly.

Some consumers have been adversely affected because of pressure being insufficient to raise water to the upper floors. Some houses--built in areas which are considered highly elevated in terms of the [water] pressure--are worse off. The problem of supplying those houses with water has been recently

solved. Only a limited number of neighborhoods remain in difficulty, and for those, appropriate technical solutions will soon be found. Generally speaking the Authority makes diligent efforts to ensure water supplies to all districts according to a regional distribution program.

[Question] Do you have any studies indicating that potable water supplies are available elsewhere?

[Reply] An extensive study has been undertaken in the search for a Ta'izz water source. Numerous exploratory boreholes have been drilled to determine sources of water. This study was previously carried out by a specialized firm. The most important result of the study is that al-Hayma and al-Dhabab aquifers are the most appropriate areas of potable water for Ta'izz.

[Question] Some years ago we learnt that the Authority had wells in al-Dhabab. What about those?

[Reply] Al-Dhabab was one of the regions in which a pilot study was carried out to find out whether it could be a potential water supply for Ta'izz. Several test and exploratory boreholes were drilled to find out storage potential in that field. At the same time alternatives were being studied by drilling in al-Hayma. Results confirmed al-Hayma as being the more feasible of the two, and that is why work is concentrated mainly in that area. The boreholes drilled in al-Dhabab were purely exploratory, no producing wells being drilled.

[Question] What surveying and prospecting techniques does the Authority use in searching for water supplies?

[Reply] The technique that the Authority uses for its studies are the following: After an area has been delineated and preliminary indications show that water may be available, in a specific area, which is the site where test or exploratory boreholes are found. The purpose of this is to determine the aquifer pumping capacity and to test water quality. In the light of these preferences and of the size of the field, a decision is then made concerning the advantages to drill producing wells. Should volumetric and quality findings be encouraging, producing wells are drilled, otherwise the matter ends with the exploratory boreholes.

[Question] What about al-Hawjala water supply? Is the Authority still using it?

[Reply] Pumping at al-Hawjala field was suspended when operation of al-Hayma source began. Since then, and until quite recently, al-Hayma water supply covered the town's needs indeed, supplies exceeded requirements and there was no need to operate al-Hawjala field. Now with declining production from al-Hayma and its inability to cover the town's needs, the Authority has decided that al-Hawjala field must go back into operation to reinforce the supply operation and that some districts have begun complaining about. The field is shortly to go into operation.

[Question] How are you planning to alleviate the water shortage?

[Reply] As already said the Authority is preparing to put al-Hawjala field into operation which, no doubt, will alleviate the severity of the crisis and reduce water shortages. On the other hand the Authority intends to drill 10 new boreholes in al-Hayma field, which will be much deeper than those now in use. Tenders have in fact been announced and several operators in this field have submitted their bids, which are at present being resolved. On the other hand we are aware that these matters take time for all legal procedures to be completed. The matter does not end there, with drilling the wells. There are studies which tend to renew pump specifications according to each well's productivity. The pumps then have to be imported and installed, all of which is time consuming until the project can be considered complete.

[Question] Asked whether the Authority branch office had any difficulties or problems to deal with, Assistant Branch Manager 'Ali 'Abd al-Aziz replied:

[Reply] Everybody knows that the country's water resources are limited and that it relies essentially on ground water. Groundwater supplies depend on volume stored, which is collected for a good many years. Constant pumping depletes water supplies in the aquifers unless sufficient recharging can compensate for withdrawals. Once we are aware of this fact we must deal with the problem positively and with a greater degree of responsibility. Rationing water use has now become a necessity. However plentiful supplies may be, unless utilization is optimized the result must surely be scarcity.

On the other hand we would like to draw the attention of consumers to the fact that when water is cut off from the district in which they live, they should try to remember that there are other districts which need water. Insistence on resumption of service immediately there is a stoppage means that others, awaiting their turn, will be deprived. We must all therefore work to conserve our water supply without wastage so that the supply will be available for a longer time.

13291/9869

CSO: 4404/257

BRIEFS

GERMAN RURAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE--A cooperation agreement was signed yesterday under the auspices of the Ministry of Agriculture & Fisheries' by our government and the Federal German Republic. This agreement is to assist in financing part of the al-Mahwit governorate rural development project. Under the terms of the agreement the German Government is to provide 5 million Deutsche marks to assist in technical work during the current 18 month interim period. The funds will be used to finance agricultural activity, potable water supply projects, to provide technical consultation for roadworks and the construction of agricultural instruction centers, in addition to conducting surveys and studies relating to rural development projects needed in al-Mahwit governorate. The agreement was signed by Dr Husayn 'Abdallah al-'Imari, Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries who represented Yemen and for the German Government by Dr Mayner Jasche [?] Rainers, German Ambassador in Sanaa who represented Germany. Also present were Assistant Undersecretary 'Ali al-Ashmury, project general manager 'Ali al-Khawlany and ministry executives. [Text] [Ta'izz AL-JUMHURIYAH in Arabic 16 Feb 87 p 2] 13291/9869

CSO: 4404/257

ARTICLE ASSESSES ECONOMIC SITUATION AFTER SOVIET OCCUPATION

Paris LES NOUVELLES D'AFGHANISTAN in French Dec 86 No 31 pp 18-21

[LES NOUVELLES D'AFGHANISTAN, monthly published by the French-Afghanistan Friendship Committee]

[Text] Little is known about Afghanistan's economic situation. By some obvious paradox, we are better informed on life in the rural areas where the "government" of Kabul is absent than we are on life in the city. This is because people can travel about freely in the rural areas side by side with the mujaheddin whereas in Kabul doors are open to foreign journalists only in an official context, thus leaving no room for improvisation and certainly not for indiscretion.

It is however the Afghan economy, "as seen from Kabul," which we will describe here thanks to the witness account of a former professor. That economy appears to be in a deep decline.

Relations between Kabul and the rural areas have become increasingly complicated for the Afghans because of insecurity in transportation (the risk of being held up or attacked by Soviet units that guard the main highways) and above all by the establishment of a kind of domestic passport which requires telling the authorities about one's destination and the reasons for the trip.

Economic relations are of course hampered by the control which the Resistance maintains on highways and also by the desire of the government which wants to show that the Resistance "is starving" the people.

Situation in Rural Areas

The few bits of information on the rural areas which one can pick up in Kabul come from refugees who escape the bombing raids of Soviet aviation and Soviet artillery fire whose targets are the outskirts of towns with only the down-town areas being held by the Afghan "authorities." Economic life is very slow in cities other than Kabul which have been emptied of their population who went abroad or to the capital. This is accentuated by the de facto curfew which is in force in certain towns very early (1400 for Djalalabad) and which makes life very difficult in the rural areas since they depend on the regional center for selling their products and buying necessities (seeds, tools, fuel, etc.).

The policy of the "authorities" who refuse to supply seeds to the peasants whom they do not control (the policy of Afghan seeds in dealing with the peasants of Logar) does not help things either. To remedy this disintegration of normal production circuits, the local population groups resort to smuggling with the risk of attacks by Soviet aviation. In regions that are not controlled by the "authorities" (90 percent of the country), farm work is constantly threatened by helicopters or by the sweeps aimed at the destruction of harvests and at checking the villages, always resulting in exactions and the flight of the population.

In the northern part of the country, information is even more difficult to obtain. Contacts are limited by the danger encountered while travelling on the Salang road (a vital artery for the supply of the Soviet bases in the south of the Hindu Kush, hence a preferred place for Resistance ambushes). This highway, which is dotted with Soviet posts, seems to be the one on which the occupiers are most eager to hold up and sometimes plunder Afghan trucks. One must say that a good part of Afghan imports today passes through the Soviet Union; this is particularly true of all trade with Japan which goes through Termez and Japanese products never fail to attract Soviet soldiers.

Soviet pressure here also runs into very strong resistance in spite of the difficulties which the proximity of the border creates for the groups fighting in this region. Some eye witness accounts report on actions on the other side of the Amu Darya.

The life of the nomadic population has been turned upside down by the invasion and traditional ways of life are often subjected to the action of aviation (decimated cattle herds, increasingly difficult crafts activities). The Uzbek and Turkmenian population groups are the ones that are most heavily hit by the Soviets who, due to their domination over the republics of Uzbekistan and Turkmenia, are very much tempted by a nationalities policy which they think they have well under control. This is illustrated by the creation of an Uzbek language department at the University of Kabul and the appearance, among the establishment, of personalities about whom it is sometimes difficult to know which side of the border they come from. In spite of this pressure, the population groups in the North face this situation squarely and the knowledge of the fate of kinfolk who fell victim to "pax stalinica" [Stalin's Peace] following the obliteration of the vestiges of the old emirate of Bukhara and the khanate of Khiva would hardly promote collaboration with the occupier and his puppets.

The country's center is practically untouched by the occupation. The Soviets no longer seem to be interested in that massif which does not threaten their communications and which for the moment undoubtedly does not seem "useful" to them; they believe that it would necessarily fall once the surrounding countryside has been secured. Moreover, the Soviet special services and their Afghan offshoot, the "Khad," certainly are secretly stirring the pot in Hazara country which is torn by religious and ethnic dissensions. It is not impossible that the rule of the Iranian-trained and Iranian-inspired militants might be promoted by the occupiers in order to discredit the Afghan

Resistance in certain Western countries and perhaps also to win a kind of neutrality on the part of Iran.

The Economy

It seems that, outside Kabul, most of the rare industrial facilities interrupted their activities (except for the extraction of gas going to the USSR). There are several reasons for this cessation of activities; first of all, the war, either directly due to combat actions or indirectly due to the shortages resulting from transportation difficulties, nipped in the bud whatever modest economic growth there was prior to the time the pro-Soviets seized power in 1978. The hunt for the elites began under Taraki and reached its high point under Amin; it still goes on today in a more reduced manner because of the departure, abroad, when they are not eliminated physically, of the most highly cultured and the most dynamic people, thus depriving the country of a labor force and an element of innovation which it already had been lacking bitterly.

In the North, in particular, the cotton industry, which had begun to grow, has now become considerably weaker down through the years. The workers were driven out by Soviet attacks and the harvest could not be brought in normally. The slim portion that was collected was not processed in a manner making it exportable and the installations suffered from a lack of maintenance and skilled personnel. In spite of the proximity of the border, Soviet technicians cannot correct these deficiencies. It is as a matter of fact impossible for a Soviet individual to live in isolation except in a fortified camp protected by the army; that of course obviously restricts the operating possibilities. These remarks also apply to the few fragments of the sugar industry which existed prior to the "revolution."

It must be noted that the Soviet intervention brought about a complete disintegration of the country's industrial structures and a considerable loss of ground, making Afghanistan even more dependent on the USSR and freezing that country in a state of increased underdevelopment. Soviet policy seems to be oriented toward terror organized in the rural areas by means of helicopter attacks against the farmers at the moment they are doing their work; this has resulted in a massive exodus either to the borders or to the cities (above all Kabul) where the refugees depend on the government for their food and where they could be organized and indoctrinated by the party's institutions. This policy obviously does not take into account the country's problems of development and even survival. It suffices to guarantee the (relative) security of Kabul, conceived as a vast internment camp and to make sure that the borders are increasingly sealed in order then to try to reduce a Resistance that has been stifled by the disappearance of its popular bases. From this angle, Afghanistan's economic collapse is rather a good thing because it accentuates dependence and makes it possible to picture the Resistance as being responsible for the increasing difficulties encountered in daily life. Moreover, the Soviets do not fail to get their money out of this situation as a result of the deliveries of gas and they are getting ready to take over the natural resources whenever they can benefit from them. It is not impossible either that the Afghan government might contribute

to the costs of occupation. By way of anecdote, we might note that a portion of the museum items in Kabul was taken to the USSR and that certain departments at the university were stripped of their equipment (school of geology). One might also wonder about the fate of some of the IBM data processing machines of the Statistic Institute, as well as the equipment in the French and German high schools following the expulsion of the instructors in 1985. Now, here, in any case, is a somewhat strange technology transfer.

In Kabul

Industrial Infrastructure (?)

As for Kabul, where the last enterprises of an industrial character still exist, we can list the Hoechst pharmaceutical production plant which still has some German technicians, several small plastic pressing enterprises (shoes, household utensils), the Djangalak machine shops (truck and bus repairs and some metal frame work), a used oil recovery and processing plant, a cement plant, and the Spinzar syndicate which is involved in textiles, threads, and weaving (wool and cotton). All the rest is of a crafts character, especially cast iron work, using recycled metals (tin cans and also the carcasses, as it were, of Soviet equipment).

Energy Problems

At the energy level, problems in Kabul are enormous. First of all, the simple increase in the population exceeded the installed production capacity. Already difficult in the summer, when hydroelectric production is at its lowest, the situation becomes catastrophic in the winter for the population of Kabul who depends to a very great extent on electricity for its heating; until recent years, electricity as a matter of fact was the least expensive source of heating (in 1985, there was talk of increasing the price of the kilowatt five times). The heat production resources are limited to the Pul-e Charkhi power plant (45 Mw) and to the new plant at Khair Khana (45 Mw) which cannot be run at full power because stockpile facilities are too small to make up for the irregular deliveries of fuel due to the attacks by the Resistance. This production becomes insufficient in accommodating the city population and this leads to supply failures that assume a permanent character; during the summer of 1984, following attacks by the Resistance against the Sarobi power line pylons, certain sections had electric power only one night out of every 10 days and one of the ritzier sections, such as Shahr-e Noe, had electricity one night every 5 days. The normal situation in the winter is such that there is electricity one night out of every three for the sections along the outskirts and every night in Shahr-e Noe. It must be noted that the privileged members of the regime do not suffer from these restrictions because they tap into lines that are always supplied (hospitals, military posts, public buildings).

This shortage of electricity is dramatic because the cold winters in Kabul cause real suffering among the most disadvantaged individuals who cannot pay to buy heating wood (which is very expensive) and who must stand in very long lines (several hours) in the snow to get a few liters of cooking oil.

This task is assigned to children and several died of the cold during the winter of 1985; freezing ice is frequent.

As for gas, which is used only for cooling, the supply fluctuates greatly (sometimes people have to wait a month to replace an empty container) and one detects a trend toward replacing the Afgaz containers with containers of Soviet origin which are not as good and which are more expensive (the government organizes this shortage in order to attain its objectives). The Afghans must thus in fact buy their gas which is exported to the Soviet Union.

The traditional fuels (charcoal and wood) tend to disappear (just a few piles in the old markets) and they can be bought by the kilogram at a prohibited price, primarily to make kababs and to make live charcoal into which one puts iron for tempering.

Wood is very expensive and the overwhelming majority of Afghans cannot buy it; moreover, it is often poor in quality, it burns fast, and it does not give much heat. Here again, a market has been organized on the basis of materials discarded by the Soviet occupation, using equipment and ammunition crates which the Red Army leaves behind.

To cook, households increasingly use tel-e-khak (petroleum) cookers imported from China or copied by the tinsmiths (with all of the risks inherent in that). This fuel is unobtainable very often and it is necessary to resort to the black market where the prices are doubled.

Fuels clearly illustrate the constant policy of the Afghan government under Soviet pressure. In the spring of 1984, a big convoy coming from the Soviet border was intercepted by the Resistance, creating a serious shortage in Kabul where stocks are reserved for the army. This shortage lasted 2 months and in the end it was obviously continued by the government which increased the price of gasoline and cooking oil 2.5 times over; both of these articles then suddenly reappeared at the stations. The corruption of the Soviet institutions appeared to the fullest at the time of that crisis; it was not rare to see a Soviet truck stopped and a soldier open the tank and siphon the content out for some children who paid triple the normal price for their purchase.

Commerce

The famous bazars of Kabul changed considerably since the not so distant time when A. Velter and E. Delloye visited them (cf. LE MONDE, March 1986). Gradually, the traditional trades disappeared, defeated by the war and the flight of the young people in response to the roundups. The little streets in the old bazar today are filled only with the cries of children or the weak voices of old people.

Still left in Kabul are merchants whom the regime pretends to be promoting and the number of Mercedes in the streets might make one think that the prosperity of this professional category keeps growing. This impression is

deceptive. While it is true that the merchants today are the only ones that can hope to get a visa to go abroad (leaving their property and their families in Afghanistan), this "liberalism" is quite useful for the regime; as a matter of fact, import transactions permit numerous deals for the people in power: smuggling of capital goods to Pakistan, profitable resale by Soviet experts of Western electronic equipment in the USSR (one really has to see how the Russian civilians are amazed as they look at the least little radio cassette to understand the juicy profits which these goods must bring in the USSR).

More generally, the tolerance which the authorities grant to these merchants is aimed at guaranteeing a transition toward total dependence on the USSR. For a number of products, the "brother country" is not yet capable of supplying the Afghan market (which however is not very demanding); the link is thus provided by private merchants although preparations are being made for taking the market over through the Afghan Cart State Syndicate which then, after the market has been taken over, will turn to the big brother to get supplies. Here is an example of this process: Duralux. This French firm, which leads in the glass industry in Afghanistan, received an offer from Afghan Cart for the purchase of its imports for one year at a rather interesting price. If that deal had gone through, the syndicate would have instituted dumping prices which would have put the private merchants out of business and, once it was the only operator on the market, it would have organized shortages and it would have turned to the USSR for supplies. That would be the end of the unbreakable glass that heralds the prestige of French technology throughout Afghanistan! Assuming equal conditions of competition, Soviet products are disdained by the buyers due to their mediocre quality and undoubtedly also, as a patriotic reflex, in spite of their lesser cost.

Wholesale trade tends to disappear and Afghanistan, the commercial crossroads of Central Asia, is a thing of the past. The main actors in commercial life continue to be the Sikhs who, closely tied to the commercial networks of the Sikhs of the world, still have enough financial backing to stage big operations. They also take care of the job of money-changing (a rather odd institution in a country with a fixed rate of exchange in the Kabul exchange market where the rate of the afghani is one-third of the official cost). On that financial market, there are some odd transactions to the benefit of the power elite and certain Soviet proconsuls!

Afghanistan's traditional exports have been declining continually because of the total war which the Soviets are conducting against the population. In the North, where the famous Afghan knotted carpets are made, the women cannot work any longer because of the helicopter raid which require constant movement back and forth and that is incompatible with the traditions employed in making high-quality carpets. Thus, the rare new carpets, which reach Kabul, are of mediocre quality and, moreover, they are very expensive, mostly because of the sums of money demanded by the Soviet soldiers to let the goods go through; quite often, they take a part of the shipment for resale or for exchange against the promise of a "hideout." The quality of the rugs (the number of knots per square decimeter), the wool (mediocre and poorly treated), the dyes (glaring and destructive of wool), and the constant adulteration of

traditional designs clearly show the decline of this important part of the Afghan heritage, symbol of a way of life and thinking that never adjusted to oppression and submission. The big rug merchants gradually export the high-quality output (stocks dating back to before the "revolution") to the Western countries where a brother or a cousin already has a stand in the street. Then, one day, the shop remains closed; another Afghan has gone into exile.

Dry fruits (above all raisins) are subjected to the same war situation: risks during picking, sorting and drying facilities in poor condition or destroyed, thefts, and constant bribes during shipment, the determination of the state to take over production which accentuates the breakup of the traditional circuits and which replaces them with incapable administrations.

The expanding sectors are those that depend on the Soviet presence and they sell Western marvels, which are unknown in the USSR, to the "advisors," such as radio cassettes, video, clothing from Taiwan and Thailand, copies of Western Perfumes, pirated cassettes of the most decadent combos of a depraved West. These sales are made in the course of shadowy swaps in which the citizens of the great fatherland of socialism live it up to some extent, such as caviar issued to soldiers to supplement their low pay and exchanged against hashish or alcohol which enables a man to forget; deals involving rubles or equipment going all the way to the high echelon of the "advisors"; and there are also cultivation and exporting of drugs which makes the chiefs of the KGB [State Security Committee] and the KHAD rich.

New products appeared on the market in direct conjunction with electric power problems: first of all, small generators stolen from or exchanged from the Soviets which popped off before the shops; then, after several months, came their Japanese competitors which are more silent and which are preferred by the consumers who are still geared toward Western technology. This proliferation is taking place at the expense of the noses and ears of strollers but it must be said that, except for the "Soviet tourists" and the Parcham party members who are all dressed up as they rush to the Pamir restaurant where their vodka waits for them, there are hardly any customers in the streets of Kabul; the heavy and grayish Soviet oppression has gradually replaced the colorful animation of Central Asia.

Prices and Wages

Prices can vary abruptly either due to normal seasonal changes but also due to abrupt shortages resulting from military events. There are no storage and preservation facilities in Kabul worthy of that name and supplies are therefore handled on a day-to-day basis without any possibility of figuring out what will turn up or what will not be there on the next day. Generally, however, the fruit and vegetable markets in Kabul are well stocked (the occupiers are astonished by this large volume of products which is far beyond the fondest dreams of Soviet households). One must of course relate the prices of these goods to the wages of the people of Kabul who do not benefit from the advantages deriving from collaboration.

In 1985, the salary of a high school teacher was 3,500 afghanis per month after 10 years of service; a government employee got 2,500 af [afghanis] per month; a domestic servant in an Afghan family made 1,500 af per month. Individuals who volunteer for the army draw 5,000 af per month, like the lowest-level collaborators of the KHAD who supplement their salaries with the help of various deals and blackmail permitted by their position.

Housing is difficult to get due to the enormous population increase in Kabul (almost 2,000,000 inhabitants). Rents have gone up much and the few new buildings are reserved for collaborators. These are buildings of Soviet design with a very mediocre quality and they do not at all fit in with the traditional life style of the Afghans. To get housing in spite of everything, the people of Kabul--on the hills dotting the city--erect traditional mud huts which are very vulnerable to earth tremors and landslides during the spring rain. Many houses which belonged to executed people or to persons who fled from the regime are taken from their heirs to be given to collaborators who cannot stay in the rural areas where the Resistance is too powerful. There is a law which provides that a family can own only one house, which seems in line with our Western criteria, but this is utterly unsuited for the real estate structure of Afghanistan where joint ownership is the rule and where families are very extended families. This law makes it possible to get some new housing facilities for the numerous offices of the KHAD and the KGB which are always looking for secluded mansions where they can perpetuate the rather strange concept which the Soviets have as regards the rights of man.

5058

CSO: 4619/12

COMMENTARY DENIES SOVIETS ANY ACCOMPLISHMENTS

Paris LES NOUVELLES D'AFGHANISTAN in French Dec 86 No 31 p 27

[LES NOUVELLES D'AFGHANISTAN, monthly published by the French-Afghan Friendship Committee]

[Article by Samad Hamed]

[Text] Dr Samad Hamed was vice prime minister of the Afghan government in 1971-1972, shortly before the monarchy was overthrown by Prince Daud. In his opinion, the Soviets did not attain their main objectives. This is what he analyzes in a publication which appeared in Germany and from which we publish an extract here ("Der Freiheitskrieg in Afghanistan" [The War for Freedom in Afghanistan], Bonn, Bonner Friedensforum ev [Registered Association], 1985; this passage is based on a translation from Germany by Andreas Baumann and Severeine Lalanne).

The USSR occupies a certain portion of Afghanistan (about 15-20 percent) while inflicting heavy damage on the country and its inhabitants. It also permitted the Afghan Communist Party formally to remain in power and it allows its leader, surrounded by soldiers of the Red Army, to live in the old royal palace, the "arg." It controls some major lines of communication going to the USSR, although it does not do that either without interruption or difficulties. It partly controls some cities, even though only during the day, and the capital, Kabul. But the Soviets did not attain their main objective in Afghanistan: in spite of great sacrifices and in spite of the cruelty of Soviet fighting methods, the Afghan Resistance is in the process of getting better both qualitatively and quantitatively. The Soviets are bound to suffer ever heavier manpower and equipment losses; at this time, they have at least 50,000 dead and wounded; their daily expenditures, according to certain calculation methods, are on the order of \$5-10 million. The Communist Party of Afghanistan is still divided into little rival groups and it is far from capable of governing the country. In spite of considerable efforts, the Soviets did not manage to organize an effective and strong Afghan army made up of communists. Nor can they count on the Afghan bureaucracy; along with Soviet advisors, Iranian communists of the Tudeh Party have recently been assigned to administrative work.

The success of the Resistance of the mujaheddin and the nervous and brutal reprisal measures of the Soviets and their native communist puppets not only led to major isolation of the USSR among the Muslim countries and the

countries of the nonaligned movement but they also, to a certain extent, enabled the West better to understand the poor reliability of the USSR as a partner in detente and the dangers deriving from the concert which the Soviets have of that detente. The brutal and shameful methods of the Soviets and their puppets in the country greatly contributed to the immunization of the major portion of the population of the countries bordering on Afghanistan.

As for the future, one might estimate that, in spite of great sacrifices, the Afghan mujaheddin will be capable of prolonging their fight against the Soviets for several years more. If this war were to involve only Afghanistan itself, the Soviets, according to their own experience, would already have found a way toward a political solution to the conflict because, compared to the Afghans, they have much greater mobility in this field. But, as we saw before, the Afghan war involves stakes that go beyond Afghanistan. That war has a regional dimension which is subjected to global force relationships. This dimension demands that the friends of Afghanistan in the region and throughout the world also make their contribution to put an end to this war. A common effort, based on a general consensus, should clearly show the USSR that its expansionist aspirations in the region have no possibility of leading anywhere, neither in short-range terms, nor in long-range terms. It is important to make sure that nobody will strengthen the hopes of the Soviets that a bilateral accord is possible with them.

In the meantime, it is necessary militarily to support the Afghans, better than this has been done until now, in their struggle which is so full of suffering and sacrifices. It is necessary to continue to give them moral and material support.

We must however not entertain the illusion that this can be done without danger or risk. And this is also a risk in which all of us must share. Because the presence of the USSR in Afghanistan is already a threatening danger to all of us. This danger can only be made worse by an ostrich policy.

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CSO: 4619/12

AFGHANISTAN

BRIEFS

CONTRACT ON COTTON FARM--A contract on technical and economic cooperation for the construction of a governmental cotton farm [word indistinct] with an area of 2,000 hectares in the framework of the Kokcha Project, was concluded today in the headquarters of the Ministry of Irrigation and Water Resources between the DRA Government and the USSR. In accordance with this contract the Soviet Union will provide the machinery, vehicles and materials needed by this farm--worth 7.4 million roubles; and will send 83 experts to cooperate on this project. [Excerpt] [Kabul Domestic Service in Pashto 1530 GMT 18 Feb 87] /9604

CSO: 4600/168

PAPER REPORTS DEVELOPMENTS IN GURKHA AGITATION

Possible Link With PRC, Nepal

Calcutta THE STATESMAN in English 24 Feb 87 pp 1, 9

[Article by Manash Ghosh]

[Text]

THE fresh outbreak of violence in the Darjeeling area coupled with Gorkha National Liberation Front's decision to boycott the Assembly poll has given rise to fears that the election process in the hills may be disrupted. The looting of a police armoury, kidnapping and killing of policemen and the burning down of police stations and Government offices are signs of unfolding insurrection.

The boycott decision betrays the GNLF's determination not to compromise its demand for a Gorkha State. The "no Gorkhaland, no vote" slogan, together, with Mr Subhas Ghisingh's promise to the hill people of wresting a homeland for Gorkhas by 1987 has only added to his compulsion.

The boycott decision was a victory for the militants in the GNLF. Even Mr Ghisingh's growing stature could not withstand the pressure of the boycott call. He had to yield to the militants who strongly favoured sending empty ballot boxes from the Darjeeling hills. A poll boycott, the militants felt, would be a more effective way of getting the Gorkha voice heard than the mere presence of five or six GNLF MLAs in the West-Bengal Assembly.

CLIMB DOWN

Moreover, participation in the poll would have amounted to a climb down from the GNLF's stand of having nothing to do with West Bengal. The GNLF militants in Darjeeling liken their movement to a roaring tiger. "But what they do not say is that Mr Ghisingh is riding it. For him to

suddenly dismount would be suicidal as the movement would certainly devour him", said an old resident of Darjeeling.

In fact, the main reason for making Mr C. K. Prodhon, convenor of the Kalimpong district committee of the GNLF, one of the three vice-presidents of the GNLF in a recent reshuffle, was to please this "warlord of Kalimpong" over whom Mr Ghisingh has little control. Apart from having his own private army, arsenal and tools for running a parallel administration, his ruthless and malevolent ways of dealing with personal and political opponents have already made him well known. It was to appease him that Mr Ghisingh included him in the GNLF delegation for talks with Mr Buta Singh in Delhi. And it is through him that Mr Ghisingh wants to have some control on Kalimpong.

Apart from the militants, the boycott decision was said to have been forced by extraneous compulsions as well. The movement's connexions, officials point out, with two neighbouring countries — Nepal and China — have been proved beyond doubt. The GNLF's international links are unfolding gradually and Delhi is aware of them. Officials refer to the "unusual interest" that Prince Gyanendra, younger brother of King Birendra of Nepal, and the Chinese Ambassador in Nepal are taking in the movement.

The GNLF's links with a former Nepalese Foreign Minister, Mr Randhir Subba, whose only claim to fame is his rabid India-baiting and being a spokesman of the powerful pro-China lobby

in Nepal, is also very strong. In fact, Indian official reports refer to Prince Gyanendra spending almost a month in a tea garden bungalow at a non-descript Nepalese hamlet called Dhamak about 70 km from the Darjeeling-Nepal border last month and holding several rounds of discussions with Mr Ghisingh prior to the latter's departure for Delhi for talks with Mr Buta Singh. Dhamak and Dharan have become rendezvous points for the GNLF leaders for holding talks with the Nepalese leaders. Last month, Mr Ghisingh went to Delhi via Dhamak from where he drove down to Patna via Rasaul.

"Every time he has gone to Delhi via Nepal after holding consultations with the Nepalese leaders. What is unprecedented is that Prince Gyanendra has never stayed away from the Kathmandu palace for so long while still in Nepal. Chinese officials have also been seen in Dhamak during Prince Gyanendra's stay there. We have confirmed reports of their deep involvement in the movement helping and guiding the GNLF in numerous ways, including men, money and material. The main actors of the movement are in Nepal and not in Darjeeling", said a senior Government officer.

Officials provide various interpretations for the foreign involvement in the movement. But the most convincing one is that it suits both Nepal and China's geopolitical interests. "Kathmandu's objective in supporting the movement is much more sinister than merely paying India back in the same coin for having once supported the Nepali Congress. The

idea is possibly to overrun the Darjeeling hills with Nepalese settlers and lay claim to a greater Nepal some day. Population growth in the hills during 1971-81 was much higher than in the previous decades. About 99% of over 6,000 labourers from Nepal, whose deportation from Meghalaya last March started the movement, are all Nepalese citizens. They were not settlers", said another important Government official.

OBJECTIVE

The Chinese objective, these officials believe, is to create through this movement a soft underbelly in this strategic Indian border region which would be to their military advantage. "Nepal seems to be helping China in attaining this objective", the official said.

There is considerable dismay in Darjeeling over the way Writers' Buildings allowed the GNLF to go out of hand because of its "inept and callous handling" during the most crucial stages of the movement. Opponents of the movement in Darjeeling say the administration's present counter-offensive, which has badly upset the GNLF's calculations, should have been started long ago. They recall how an incompetent district administration abdicated its authority and allowed the movement to gain total sway in the hills.

"The guilty moved about freely, carrying on their depredations with impunity. The demand for replacement of the District Magistrate and the Superintendent of Police was not accepted by Writers' Buildings until late last year when the administration had

considerably lost its credibility. Even now, after repeated imploring, Writers' Buildings refuses to strengthen the intelligence set up in the hills, which is about one-tenth of the required strength. Obviously the gaps in our information channel are wide and that is why we are often caught napping", said an important police official.

All this has emboldened the GNLF militants, especially those in the Mirik and Kalimpong area. Hordes of armed Nepalese citizens crossing over to the resort town of Mirik on the Darjeeling-Nepal border to take part in GNLF demonstrations has been a common feature. Their participation in the current spate of violence in Mirik is concrete proof of their involvement in the movement.

In Kalimpong, Mr C. K. Prodhon holds his own public "durbar" and runs a parallel administration. At the specially set up Gorkhaland courts, he with the help of his lieutenants and the Gorkha Volunteer corps, try CPI(M) members and sympathizers, settle private disputes, impose fines and imprison dissenters of the GNLF movement in "Gorkhaland cells" (like the recently discovered ones in Rauree Bazar). Purn Rai, who posed a threat to his leadership, was kidnapped and killed.

The sizable Bhutia, Lepcha and Tibetan population of Kalimpong has been swamped and terrorized by the Nepalese in the last two years. Every Nepalese house that was raided in Kalimpong last month had different kinds of arms and explosives ranging from muskets and pipeguns

to pressure detonators and booby traps. Machines for making ammunition were also recovered. All this led us to wonder what was all this preparation for? Was it for an armed insurrection? No wonder in Kalimpong, Prodhon's men kept our forces engaged in an exchange of fire which lasted over two hours", said a senior CRP officer.

BLAME

It would be wrong to lay the entire blame on a weak district administration for helping the GNLF hold unrivalled sway in the hills. Senior Government officials hold the political mishandling of the movement by the CPI (M) leadership responsible for providing impetus to the movement. The CPI (M)'s "unique experiment" of countering a separatist movement with its own party cadres rather than dealing with it through the administration, proved politically counter-productive and, in terms of lives, very expensive.

In fact, the excess committed by the CPI(M) cadres, like the killing of two women in August last year, proved a turning point for the GNLF.

"Had the CPI(M) leaders agreed to strengthen the district administration, dealt with the movement administratively and countered the GNLF propaganda with Government and not party publicity material, the result would have been different. The CPI(M) would not have found itself practically wiped out in the hills. All this should be a lesson for the Congress/I. It had better watch out as it will be the GNLF's next target", said senior Government official.

Document Said Falsification of History

Calcutta THE STATESMAN in English 11 Feb 87 p 9

[Text] The GNLF memorandum to the Prime Minister is a "falsification of history" the Chief Minister said in Calcutta on Tuesday while releasing the second part of an Information document prepared by the West Bengal Government on Gorkhaland agitation. The document seeks to clarify the State Government's stand on the agitation including certain economic issues relating to the development of the Darjeeling hill areas.

Mr Jyoti Basu said that the Nepal population in the hill areas had been inflated by the GNLF. The GNLF had claimed in the memorandum that Darjeeling had been ceded "...to the British Indian Government" by Nepal--a claim that is "historically untenable." "Darjeeling hills were never a part of Nepal but were transferred by way of gift or through war by the Kings of Sikkim and Bhutan.

Referring to the Nepali population in the country--mostly in West Bengal--the Chief Minister said that it numbered 2.1 million according to 1981 census, as against 1.4 million in 1971. The GNLF's memorandum does not refer to the fact that the original inhabitants of the Darjeeling hills were Lepchas, and both the Nepalese and Bengalis had gone to the area in response to the demands generated by the tea industry controlled by the British.

Regarding the GNLF movement, the document said that "it was intolerant of dissent and other political views and forces." The GNLF was bent on establishing its hegemony on the hills and achieving its end by resorting to intimidation, kidnapping, large-scale arson, destruction of property and murder of its political adversaries. Growing factional conflicts within the organization, often centering round issues of control of funds collected in various forms, was a new phenomenon, the document stated.

Alarming

An alarming feature of the GNLF campaign among the Nepalese was urging soldiers to quit the army and fight for Gorkhaland. This was aimed at "demoralizing these armed personnel and creating disaffection among them. The sinister implication of this campaign among the Nepali-speaking Indian soldiers should be taken into account while assessing this movement," the document said. The Centre's ambiguous stand on the character of the movement has created confusion among the people. The Centre had never agreed that the movement was anti-national although the State Government had been insisting on it.

The Chief Minister said that he had stopped calling the movement anti-national after Mr Ghishing had regretted having written letters to the King of Nepal and various other countries. According to the document, the Prime Minister's categorical rejection of the demand for Gorkhaland was helpful. But his refusal to describe the movement as anti-national had however, failed to create the desired impact on the Nepali-speaking masses. The GNLF supporters have been given the impression that the Prime Minister is on their side.

Complication

The statements made by the Prime Minister and other Central Ministers and Central Congress (I) leaders had also complicated the issue, the document said. The confusions created by such statements helped only those who were trying to balkanize the country. Citing instances of double talk, the document said that "the State Government was being criticized at the same time for being both chauvanistic and also fomenting Nepal separatism by stressing demand for the recognition of the Nepali language and for regional autonomy.

The objectives of pointing to inconsistencies, doubletalk, evasions and straightforward untruths were not to score points but to emphasize the ways in which the difficulties facing the State Government in handling the explosive situation have been compounded by numerous acts of omission and commission by the Centre and the National and State leaders of the Congress (I).

The document warned that the GNLF and its policies had dangerous implications, not only for the State Government or the Left Front but for the country as a whole. The Centre, it stated, seemed to have fallen into the GNLF trap which aimed at creating a rift between the Centre and the State Government.

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CSO: 5650/0098

REPORT ALLEGES CHAKMAS BEING TERRORIZED BY BANGLADESH

New Delhi INDIA TODAY in English 15 Mar 87 pp 76-80

[Text]

FOR the past nine months, Chakma refugees have been fleeing Bangladesh terrorised by the Bangladesh Army. Last fortnight, the Buddhist tribals came in waves into Tripura swelling to over 45,000, haunted by memories of their women raped, houses burnt and people mercilessly shot or hacked to death. Senior Correspondent RAMESH MENON with Photographer PRASHANT PANJIAR visited the makeshift camps in Tripura set up by the state Government, where anger and tragedy punctuated the atmosphere. His report on the atrocities and the problems the new refugees pose.


EXACTLY 16 years ago, the jungles were swarming with thousands of terrified refugees fleeing from the barbaric atrocities of the Pakistan Army. That influx led to one of the bloodiest births in modern history—the creation of Bangladesh. And now, the wheel of tragedy has come full circle. Last fortnight, the same jungles along the borders of Tripura were once again alive with a steadily growing flood of refugees fleeing in terror from the atrocities of the Bangladesh armed forces.

They are history's least-known refugees and the tragic dimensions of their situation have largely gone unnoticed, and unreported. But the tales of horror brought by the Chakmas, the Buddhist tribes living in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, are vocal witness to the nightmare they are escaping from, and to the only sanctuary they can find—India.

Each day, as dusk drops its shroud of darkness over the dense forests, entire families of Chakmas, many barefooted and carrying their meagre belongings, slip across the border to India. The influx started nine months ago and by last fortnight there were around 45,000 Chakmas in the overcrowded, makeshift refugee camps set up by the Tripura Government.

From the Indian point of view, the

steady influx of a growing number of refugees is a serious problem with alarming ramifications. But on humanitarian grounds, there is no way the state Government can put a stop to it. The stories of brutalities brought by each family point to a human tragedy of massive proportions—another genocide. Anil Chakma from Pablakhali village in the hill tracts, entered India with his wife and four children on February 9. They had walked barefoot through the jungles surviving on bamboo shoots and wild roots. They had decided to flee after the Bangladesh Army unleashed an orgy of violence—attacked



their village, beat up Chakma men, raped their women and burnt and looted their houses.

The litany of horror is repeated with each arrival. Annai Marma, 32, from Khagrachheri district sobs as she recounts how six army men beat up her husband and then gang-raped her in front of him. Nundibala Chakma, 39, saw her husband being shot dead before being dragged to an army camp and gang-raped for two days. Tanyajuri Chakma, who came into Tripura last fortnight, still nurses festering wounds on her breasts where her nipples were bitten off by Bangladesh army personnel. Says she tonelessly: "The army jawans usually encircle a Chakma village, segregate men and then rape the women. The younger and beautiful ones are taken to army camps and kept for many days." Lambracha Murmal, a pretty 16-year-old girl, is still in a state of shock. In mid-December, she was raped by three jawans who took her into a forest and kept her there for a few days. She managed to escape from their clutches and join other Chakmas seeking sanctuary in India.

It is hardly surprising that none of the Chakma refugees are prepared to return to Bangladesh. Specially now that the Bangladesh military offensive against the Chakma tribals has been stepped up to crush the insurgent operations of the Shanti Bahini guerrillas, led by young Chakmas who are demanding autonomy.

The insurgency has been going on for at least a decade and has claimed thousands of lives on both sides. Bangladesh President H.M. Ershad told newly-elected parliament members in mid-July of 1986 that in the last 10 years about 1,000 people had been killed. Shanti Bahini sources put the figure at least ten times more. Whatever the truth, the Chakmas pouring into India believe that returning to Bangladesh means certain death. According to figures released by the respected human rights organisation Amnesty International, over 800 Chakmas have been killed in the last eight months in the hill tracts following army operations.

The Bangladesh Government had agreed to take back 24,000 refugees beginning from January 15, but the Chakmas refused to leave. When Indian security forces tried to collect them together to send them back to Bangladesh, many of

them fled into the nearby forests while others flatly refused to budge from the relief camps. Their argument was simple and spoke volumes for what they had undergone—that if they crossed over to the hill tracts, they would be killed. And if they were going to die, they would rather die in India than in Bangladesh. Says Bhagat Singh, CRPF commandant: "We were helpless. The Chakmas just sat tight saying that we could shoot them but they would not go back."

The fact that more refugees are pouring in every day with fresh stories of the genocide in the hill tracts, has only strengthened their resolve to stay in India.

Said Sujata Chakma, 13: "We will go back only after we get independence." The memory of the atrocities which she witnessed, including her friends being gang-raped by Bangladesh army jawans, is graphically engraved in her young mind.

With the refugee flow increasing each day, the Tripura Government is faced with an unenviable task. Strapped for resources, it has already spent over Rs 2.25 crore on the Chakmas in the last nine months. But money is not the only problem. The major concern centres around the fact that a few hundred Chakmas have left the refugee camps and infiltrated into the interior, taken up local jobs and show every sign of settling down permanently. Intelligence sources fear that Tribal National Volunteer (TNV) extremists might also infiltrate into India from Bangladesh in the guise of refugees.

Tripura Chief Minister Nripen Chakraborty has tried to draw the attention of the Centre to the need to stop what he termed as "the sea of humanity flowing into Tripura", but with little success so far. Chief Secretary N.P. Navani feels that though the state is being saddled with a problem of complex dimensions, they cannot ignore it either because of the humanitarian issues involved.

THE camps at Silacheri, Kathalcheri, Korbook and Takumbari—all close to the Bangladesh border—are as

Chakraborty says, a sea of humanity, with hundreds of displaced families attempting to stitch together the bits of their shattered lives. On some days, the state Government finds it difficult to accommodate the refugees as they come in hundreds and are forced to sit out in the open, huddling together for warmth during the chilly nights.

The Chakma crisis is essentially one of identity. During partition, the Chakmas were angered when the British granted the 5,138 square miles of the Chittagong Hill Tracts to erstwhile east Pakistan. Chakma leader Snehkumar Chakma rushed to New Delhi to beg that the area be allowed to remain part of India. But nothing came of it. Gopal Chakma, one of the tribal leaders who has been living in India for the last decade, feels that India was not concerned since the Chakmas who occupied the hill tracts were politically unorganised.

Soon after the creation of Bangladesh in 1971, another Chakma leader Manobendra Narayan Larma, led a delegation to Dhaka to ask the late prime minister Sheikh Mujibur Rehman, if the Chakmas living in the hill tracts could be given autonomy and a ban imposed on the entry of non-tribals into the area. Mujibur would have none of it, as he said: "Bangladesh will never recognise any dual identity."

Realising that there was no political solution, the Shanti Bahini was formed with the idea of gaining autonomy through an armed struggle. But an added problem arose in 1974 when an economic crisis forced Dhaka to encourage poor Muslim Bengalis to settle in the hill tracts. This was partially to meet the demands of land-hungry peasants in the heavily-populated plains. But more important, the resettlement was a device to ensure alteration of the demographic position of the hill tracts which were dominated by the Chakmas. Almost overnight, the Chakma population in the hill tracts was reduced from 98 per cent to around 70 per cent.

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CSO: 5600/4771

MOREOVER, most of the resettled Muslim peasants were ex-servicemen. This was a deliberate ploy to dampen the Chakma insurgency and also ensure that the Chakma villagers, who are basically simple people, would be prevented from giving shelter to Shanti Bahini guerrillas. Inevitably, the target of the insurgents became the Muslim resettlers. Last fortnight, over 200 casualties were recorded in the hill tracts as the Shanti Bahini raided army camps and Muslim settlements. The Bahini fields over 7,000 guerrillas, 2,000 of whom are armed, and the recent renewal of atrocities has ensured that their number will increase. Says Jorna Chakma whose husband, Chandrakanta, was killed last year: "More youngsters will join the Shanti Bahini now. We just cannot be wiped out."

The continuing ethnic and communal strife in the hill tracts have left the Chakmas bitter and revengeful. Says Shantibikas Chakma, a high school teacher: "Our only hope now is armed combat. After all these years of oppression, there can be no short cuts." Triptimoy Chakma, 21, whose father was killed before his eyes when he was just six years old, says defiantly: "If our future generations are to live like human beings, we have to take the guns on our shoulders." Most Chakma youngsters feel the same way.

But there are dangerous implications in this for the Indian Government. As with the Tamil militants from Sri Lanka, India could be caught in a diplomatic fix if the Chakmas decide to carry on their armed struggle from Tripura. Despite this, New Delhi seems to be surprisingly complacent about the issue and no effort has been made to put pressure on Dhaka to stop the brutalities across the border.

Chakma leaders say that they will only go back if a tripartite meeting between representatives of Bangladesh, India and the Chakmas themselves produces an assurance that the persecutions will definitely stop.

But there is little likelihood of that happening. The general feeling among government officials is that Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi has chosen to play down the Chakma issue during his leadership of the South Asian Association for Regional

Cooperation.

Admittedly, there are no easy solutions. But New Delhi's current complacency may cost the country heavily. Tripura is already affected by TNV extremism. The influx of thousands of tribals from Bangladesh, who obviously intend to settle down in the state, will only increase ethnic pressures—and give TNV extremists added leverage and scope. The Chakmas may have been Dhaka's problem but they are increasingly becoming India's as well now.

PROTOCOL ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS SIGNED WITH SOVIET UNION

New Delhi PATRIOT in English 16 Feb 87 p 3

[Text]

India and the Soviet Union will promote and expand telecommunication links between them through telephone, telegraph and telex services and extend them to industrial and other projects under a protocol signed in New Delhi on Sunday.

Full scale international subscriber dialled telephone service between the two countries will be expanded, direct circuits increased to meet demand and they will assist each other in providing telecom traffic transit to some third countries.

Under the protocol, the two governments will promote technical support to the Festival of India in the USSR and the Festival of USSR in India in 1987-88 and other bilateral events in the future.

The two countries will explore the possibilities of setting up automatic transit of telephone calls to third countries via India and the USSR and prepare concrete action plan on extending telecom facilities to projects, by the end of the current year.

The projects over those constructed or operated on the basis of inter-governmental agreements on the territories of the two countries.

The telecom links will include leasing of communication channels to users.

They will jointly study the

technical and economic aspects of telecom development by means of the satellite communication system.

The protocol was signed for India by Mr D K Sangal, secretary in the department of telecommunications and for the Soviet side by Mr G G Kudriavtsev, first deputy minister of posts and telecommunications.

Under the protocol, the two governments will elaborate and coordinate technical proposals on the lease of Soviet communication satellite transponders to India.

They will examine the status of communication technology and industry in both the countries for long term cooperation in use of components manufactured by the two countries. Joint development and production of communication equipment. Supply and sale of equipment to each other and to third countries.

Joint manufacture of communication equipment.

Participation in the construction of communication projects for third countries and joint projects for scientific research and training.

They agreed to prepare and coordinate in 1987-88, a joint programme of research of wave propagation in the 10-30 ghz frequency band at the USSR international centre (Dubna) and to

discuss the possibilities of setting up a testing ground station in India.

Noting the common need to expand telecommunication network and the possible benefit of exchange of experience in this field the two sides agreed to have a broader exchange of information on the strategy and technology accepted in both countries and to study the possibility of joint development of technology and production in this field.

For this purpose, before the next bilateral meeting, the two governments agreed to further explore the possibility of cooperation in manufacture of microwave relay equipment and digital aerial line carrier systems.

Manufacture of antenna for satellite communication systems.

Joint cooperation in the manufacture of cable pressuring equipment and rectifier unit and mechanisation of cable laying equipment.

The two governments shall promote the expansion of business contacts between enterprises and specialists to acquaint each other with the operation of communication facilities and enterprises of both sides, sharing work experience and exchanging scientific and technological information in the telecom field.

TEHRAN COMMENTS ON TOWER COMMISSION REPORT

LD281404 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian 1108 GMT 28 Feb 87

[Unattributed commentary: "The Publication of the Tower Commission's Report in America"]

[Text] Following the publication of the Tower Commission's report in America, Donald Regan, the White House chief of staff, who was severely criticized because of the chaos in operations at the White House and several other matters, has resigned. Howard Baker, a former Republican senator, has been appointed by Reagan to replace him.

In addition to the criticisms levelled at a number of U.S. officials, such as the secretaries of state and defense, and the former chairman of the National Security Council, the authors of the report, who were appointed by Reagan 3 months ago, have attributed instances of extremely important mistakes to those close to Reagan, though stressing that the President was not aware of them. Moreover, a recent TASS report said that one of the major tasks of the Tower Commission was to eradicate the universal perception inside and outside the United States that all operations had been directed by Reagan himself.

Following receipt of the report, Reagan announced that after studying it, he would soon announce his new policy in response to the report, which he described as very important. This comes against the background of some distinguished U.S. individuals and circles stressing the need for the President to admit mistakes were made, and demanding that with a firm approach and effecting the necessary purges, he should pave the way for ending the current chaos.

This comes at a time when Ronald Reagan and the Republican faction--by accepting the Tower Commission's report and effecting certain specific measures--are endeavoring to achieve their ultimate objectives and to extricate themselves from the current crisis. However, much circumstantial evidence indicates that such measures would lead to nothing, and ultimately fail to alter the outcome of the crisis, because the approach of the congressional committees' investigation and the coming presidential election campaign, which almost coincides with the end of the work of those committees, the Democrats appear intent on keeping the conflict alive and so secure their

victory in the coming election with a substantial majority over their Republican rivals.

During this period, apart from the numerous instances of falsehood perpetrated by Reagan and those around him to protect the President, important individuals such as the National Security Council chairman and his assistant, the White House spokesman, the CIA director, and the White House chief of staff have lost their jobs and been replaced by others. These changes and the continued conflict have in effect much reduced the Reagan administration's power and ability at home and abroad, thus striking severe blows at America's standing in the world, so much so that many U.S. allies have developed suspicion and doubt about Washington's declared policies and manifested their dissatisfaction by distancing themselves from the United States.

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CSO: 4600/172

IRAN

QOM MONTHLY: IF NO WAR, JIHAD AGAINST IRAQ

LD021033 Belgrade TANJUG in English 0949 GMT 2 Mar 87

[Text] Tehran, 2 Mar (TANJUG)--If Iraqi troops had not attacked Iranian border provinces in September 1980 and thus caused the 7-year-old war, it is highly probable that Iran would have started a "jihad" with the aim of liberating Iraqi moslems from the godless rule, the Iranian monthly PASADR E Eslami [name as received] (Guardian of islam) claims.

The latest issue of the monthly edited by a group of theologists of the Shi'ite seminary in the holy city of Qom, claims that by attacking the borders Iraqi President Saddam Husayn in fact gave the Iranians a chance to perform their religious obligation.

While the highest Iranian officials explain to the world that they are continuing the war with the aim of "punishing the aggressor," the Qom monthly calls for the toppling of the godless regime in Baghdad, claiming that this is the obligation of every capable Moslem regardless of state borders. In support of the claim that the defense of a religion surpasses all territorial limits, PASADR E ESLAMI cites a Koran rule under which the struggle for religion is more important than the struggle for the homeland.

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CSO: 4600/172

IRAN

IRNA CITES FOREIGN MEDIA ON IRANIAN ADVANCE

LD161840 Tehran IRNA in English 1835 GMT 16 Mar 87

[Text] London, 15 Mar (IRNA)--Iranian combatants have overrun Iraqi Army at the Gerdmand heights in northeastern Iraq, a journalist for THE WASHINGTON POST has confirmed.

In a dispatch Monday from Iran's new 20 kilometre advance into northern Iraq, Patrick Tyler described the breakthrough as giving Iran another military victory on Iraqi soil, which he saw as "potentially threatening Iraq's northern transportation and vital oil fields."

"Since Iraq's largest oil fields and refining facilities are at Kirkuk, only 60 miles south of Rawanduz, the Iranian victory gives it a springboard against Iraq's most precious economic target," he said.

Visiting the battlefield with a score of foreign correspondents, Tyler referred to telling signs that the Iraqi soldiers had been routed or forced to run away.

He referred to eight Soviet tanks captured in good working order, along with unused Iraqi ammunition belts, hand grenades, rocket canisters, discarded helmets, and ration tins, scattered throughout the trenches.

THE WASHINGTON POST journalist relates the opening up of the northern front by Iran with its recent advances towards the key Iraqi city of Basra and said that Tehran "has demonstrated again that it can hit Iraq's well-equipped Army at more than one place along the 730 mile front."

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CSO: 4600/172

MILITARY TECHNOLOGY ADVANCES TOWARD SELF-SUFFICIENCY

Tehran KAYHAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 21 Feb 87 p 4

[Article: "Expertise about Weapons Grows in the War"]

[Text] All Maintenance Operations on Military Helicopters Are Carried out by Aviation Specialists with the Land Force.

We Were Able To Change the Artillery Imaging System by Employing Electronics in That System.

The First Production Line Producing Ammunition for Kalashnikov Guns and T-55 Tanks Has Been Opened; Production Has Also Started on Anti-Aircraft and Anti-Tank 23 mm Missiles.

Total Self-Sufficiency Is Our Objective. Our Efforts To Become Self-Sufficient Have To Be Made in the Complicated Area of Military Industries, like Missiles and Airplanes.

The value of scientific and industrial discoveries and inventions which were realized during the period of the war which has been foisted on us cannot be ignored or denied. Army units and the weapons division in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard and Jihad have achieved self-sufficiency in the factories. Every person and every institution that has certain capabilities has invented a device or a tool that can be used in the defensive war. This is paving the way for achieving victory. Consequently, noticeable success has been achieved in efforts that are being made in all areas: weapons, logistics and combat as well as support for these areas. This makes us confident in our abilities and our resources. The road is a long one: from manufacturing field toilets and kitchens to manufacturing and maintaining complicated rocket devices and airplanes. It is a long road which freedom fighters who are committed to their efforts have traveled, and that gives us a good indication that victory will come soon.

A review of how some inventions are being manufactured by Iranian inventors and military men confirms once again the expertise which has been gained during this war that has been foisted on us. Maintenance operations for military helicopters were carried out by aviation specialists in the land force. That enhanced both the combat and support powers of the land force's aviation and made it greater than it was early in the war. In this regard one military leader says, "All

helicopter maintenance operations for 25, 50, 100 and 300 hour periods are carried out immediately. And although maintenance operations for these airplanes are highly sensitive, our personnel carry them out in the best possible way. Also some spare parts which used to be imported are now manufactured in the country. These spare parts have made the use of military helicopters in military operations possible. Also all training courses are now being conducted by local personnel. But before the revolution's victory 1,400 American experts trained pilots and technicians in the land force's aviation.

In another context the fire aiming system at the artillery training center in Isfahan has been changed, and electronics are now employed in that system. In this regard an assistant at the Artillery Training Center in Isfahan said, "The amount of training which was offered at this center during the war that has been foisted on us has increased tenfold. This is evidence of the progress that we made in the war. That center has been successful in maintaining and utilizing new systems."

The assistant at the aforementioned center added, "We have been able to change the artillery imaging system and to employ electronics in it."

"We can carry out all light and medium maintenance operations on anti-aircraft artillery and surface to air missiles. Before the Revolution these maintenance operations used to be carried out by foreign military experts."

"We can also carry out maintenance operations on surface to air missiles without any need for foreign experts."

"We were also able to build important and valuable instruction laboratories with the equipment that we captured, and we were able to conduct all radar maintenance operations. These operations used to be carried out abroad. At the present time we are assembling drones at the aforementioned center and putting the final touches on them. These airplanes are used in training. The first production line producing ammunition for Kalashnikov guns and T-55 tanks has been opened. In this regard the general manager of the Military Industries Organization says, "Before the Revolution 150 foreign experts were working in weapons and ammunition factories. After those foreigners left the country, Iranian experts took over the management of these factories. Factories producing ammunition and materiel, which are subordinate to the Military Industries Organization, produce different kinds of ammunition and materiel. They produce small caliber and large caliber ammunition which are needed by the armed forces in the Islamic Republic. These factories, which use all their resources in light of the plan which has been adopted by the Ministry of Defense, have produced for the first time ammunition for Kalashnikov guns, T-55 tanks and other military missiles."

Work has also started on producing anti-aircraft and anti-tank 23 mm missiles. Models of those missiles, the exploding anti-tank variety, have been placed on display in the War Inventions Wing at the Great Exhibition of Isfahan.

Self-Sufficiency

The chief of the Joint Command of the army of the Islamic Republic says, "A new division has been established in military institutions; it is known as the Self-Sufficiency Division. With the cooperation of the Ministry of Defense our army has been able to get rid of its subordination to foreign countries in the area of maintaining equipment and devices, particularly airplanes and frigates. Maintaining airplanes and frigates requires know-how and information about complicated technology in the area of manufacturing spare parts of different kinds, communications equipment, pontoons, guns, mortar shells, rocket launchers, helicopters, radar divices and cameras. This know-how and information are also required for the production of various light and heavy ammunition.

Manufacturing Armored Personnel Carriers

An armored personnel carrier has been manufactured for the first time in Iran. Mr Nasir Ahmad Biki, who manufactured that armored personnel carrier said, "Approximately 60 percent of the parts that go into building an armored personnel carrier are manufactured locally. For the first time in the world a mortar gun was placed on the base of that personnel carrier which is superior to its counterparts which are manufactured abroad. The cost of producing that carrier amounts to 500,000 (tawman) [meaning unknown].

"Thanks to the efforts of a number of officers and ranking officers who specialize in the construction effort, the most complicated rocket systems in the world have been maintained and repaired. These officers who are committed to the construction effort are part of the ideological, political division serving in the fleet in the Persian Gulf and the Sea of Oman. Their accomplishment is a magnificent step toward self-sufficiency in our Islamic homeland.

"The division which manufactures and produces military spare parts in Construction Jihad has manufactured more than 200 different kinds of spare parts. Ever since the war that has been foisted on us got started, the division that produces military spare parts in Construction Jihad in Faris Province has produced thousands of spare parts for military equipment.

"Under the ill-fated Pahlavi regime all these spare parts were imported. They were purchased from the United States and Israel. The division that manufactures military spare parts in Construction Jihad in Shiraz has produced thousands of spare parts that are very much needed and required by the various combat units at the front. That division has also maintained weapons and manufactured spare parts needed by land forces."

Manufacturing the Dhu-al-Fuqqar Katyusha

One fighter in the Iranian army was able to install a Katyusha on a tank that was captured from the enemy. That fighter whose name is Maj Mir Yunis Masum Zadeh, says, "This weapon is a 60-round rocket launcher that has been installed on a tank captured from the enemy. This weapon can overcome all land barriers and can be fired from a moving or a standing position. All parts for that weapon

are manufactured in the country." The technical division in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard has been able to produce synthetic Flax gas which is used in soldering operations. In this regard the minister of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard says, "Our aim is to become totally self-sufficient. We have to make efforts in the complicated area of military industries, in manufacturing missiles, airplanes and anti-aircraft devices, for example, and everything our country needs to defend itself. These efforts are now being carried out in all institutions. That is why we now have a great military industry. We have factories producing mortar and 120 mm and 60 mm missiles. A 9-round rocket launcher has also been manufactured in the country for the first time. That launcher is used against semi-light targets such as vehicles, personnel carriers, concrete [fortified] positions and RPG launching positions. This launcher which can fire 36 rounds per minute separately, can also be fired semi-automatically or fully automatically."

Revolutionary Guard units have also manufactured defensive equipment for chemical, germ and radiation warfare.

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ECONOMIC PROGRESS THROUGH 1986 REVIEWED

Tehran KAYHAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 14 Feb 87 p 6

[Article by Diya' Musa: "The Tremendous Advancements in Development Efforts under the Revolution"]

[Text] Production in Electronic Industries Rose by 41 Percent.

Iranian Scientists Invent a Replacement Device for a Coronary Artery Valve.

One Hundred and Fifty Thousand Families Were Given Homes in 1986.

Electricity Was Introduced for the First Time in 50,000 Villages.

Progress in Development Has not Been Affected by the Decline in Oil Prices or by the Costs of the War That Has Been Foisted on the Country.

Although the State Lost 11 Billion Dollars Due to the Decline in Oil Prices, It Has not Borrowed a Single Dollar from Foreign Banks and Countries.

Developments which have been observed in various branches of Iran's economy during the past 8 years of the Islamic Revolution confirmed the upward trend of development efforts in the country. The economic difficulties which had been encountered under the Shah's administration are being dealt with. The Islamic Revolution did not use a cosmetic approach to treat Iran's chronic economic diseases; instead, it treated those diseases until it managed to eliminate them. The Shah's economy was an inert economy that was based on control of the country's raw materials and natural resources by foreign monopolies. A 1976 study, which stated that the Iranian economy was the weakest link in the capitalist economy worldwide, also stated that Iran's economy was more vulnerable because Iran relied on the sale price of oil to import consumer and luxury goods and meet the costs of its military expansionist policy as well. It was estimated that outlays for American, European and Israeli weapons in 1970 amounted to 715 billion dollars. That is equal to 38 percent of general revenues. At the same time among the phenomena which emerged after the outbreak of the Islamic Revolution were the deficit in the balance of trade and inflation. Although the Islamic government failed to eliminate these phenomena because it was unable to solve the country's economic problems, Islamic leaders did manage to put together a comprehensive program to solve all the country's problems. They were

able to put it into practice in a record period of time. They thus established an independent national economy that is not dominated by colonialism and is based on the following principles:

1. Providing everyone's basic needs: shelter, food, clothing, health services and education.
2. Providing for everyone opportunities and possibilities for employment, with the aim of achieving zero unemployment.
3. Relying on the people to build an independent economy by developing local capabilities and abilities and speeding up the pace of development efforts in the country to achieve self-sufficiency first, and, second, to export products abroad.

With these principles being put into practice, monetary inflation and unemployment continued to decline. The governor of Iran's Central Bank stated at a press conference, "In 1986 the rate of inflation fell to 11.2 percent, and it will fall to zero after the war comes to an end. But unemployment is continuing to decline because of the government's commitment to find employment opportunities for all Iranian citizens."

On the other hand, Islamic leaders have placed the development of technological industries at the top of their list of priorities and concerns. Major production factories have made progress in the kind and quantity of goods they produce. These factories are now relying on the creative energies of Iranian experts after American and European experts were thrown out of all the country's factories. Western governments also imposed an economic embargo on the Islamic Republic and banned the export of spare parts to our factories to stop the process of construction and production. Nevertheless, high production rates which were realized from 1980 to 1986 showed the bankruptcy of western countries on the one hand, and the Iranian people's ability to remain steadfast and creative, on the other. We will cite actual examples of the rising rates of production from official statistics.

A. In 1985-1986 production in the chemical and pharmaceutical industries rose by 35 percent.

B. Production in the automobile industry--all kinds of automobiles--rose by 47 percent during the same period.

C. Production in the food industry rose by 65 percent during the same period.

D. During the last 6 months of 1985 production in the electronic industry rose by 41 percent.

E. When Iraqi airplanes raided Iran's oil fields and caused fires in some of them, Iranian engineers and technicians were able to come up with new techniques to put out these fires. These Iranian engineers and technicians achieved remarkable success.

F. Iranian technicians devised new kinds of oil loading docks. Sixty percent of them were implemented in 1985 on Qishm Island, which is located in the southern part of the Persian Gulf. By mid 1986 they were ready for operations, and many supertankers that are used to deliver oil to various parts of the world were loaded from those piers.

G. The Institute for Scientific and Industrial Research announced that it has produced medical devices which were invented by Iranian physicians. These devices include a replacement valve for the coronary artery, which was invented by Dr 'Ali Reza 'Ismat, the well-known heart surgeon. The institute also produced hearing aids and canes for the blind.

H. In September 1985, while touring a factory where helicopters are manufactured, President Khamenei talked about the tremendous change that is taking place in heavy industry. He said, "Considerable progress has been made in the helicopter industry after the Islamic Revolution succeeded in its efforts to reach self-sufficiency. We will be exporting these helicopters as well as spare parts for them to developing countries in the near future. The progress that is happening in industry today, thanks to the perseverance of the specialists we have in those areas, is much better than the progress we had during the previous regime when 40 percent of those working in industry were Americans."

Specific Advancements in Agricultural Production: The Shah's family and the feudal families which had ties to the Shah's family used to regard farmers and those employed in the agricultural sector as hired hands who were not entitled to sharing the profits of their labor, not to mention the land. That is why sharp agricultural crises were experienced in Iran, and they caused the country to import agricultural products from European countries and Israel. Most farmers left their villages to look for a living in the country's major cities. But after the outbreak of the Islamic Revolution, the Islamic government gave special attention to the development of the agricultural sector. Hundreds of thousands of hectares were distributed to farmers, and families who had given up farming during the Shah's regime were given title to fallow land. The Islamic government gave those families all the facilities that would enable them to cultivate this land. It trained most farmers to operate agricultural machinery, and it made the process of drilling artesian wells easier for them by introducing advanced irrigation systems which are used in advanced countries. The Islamic government introduced a complete change in all aspects of life in rural areas. That change was based on the notion that educating people is the primary factor in the process of bringing about complete change. At the same time agricultural banks gave farmers loans. Statistics from the Agricultural Bank in Guilan Province indicate that the bank extended loans worth 4.182 billion rials to farmers in the province during a 4-month period, from May to August of 1985. If that sum was made available in loans to Guilan Province alone, then the credit that will be extended to farmers throughout the country will amount to hundreds of billions of rials. The process of developing rural areas in Iran included the following:

First, Devoting Attention to Electricity: In no more than 7 years, over 50,000 villages, which did not have electricity received it. The process of introducing electricity into the remaining villages of the country continues. By 1990 all the villages in the country will have electricity, and there will not be a

single village without it. Such steps are considered unique in Third World and developing countries. They reduced social and cultural differences between cities and villages. Accordingly, most farmers have returned to their villages, and migration from rural to large urban areas has been curbed significantly.

Second, Providing Housing: The Construction Jihad Organization, the al-Shahid Organization and the Organization for the Oppressed built hundreds of homes in the country's villages. Branches of these organizations have been established in various areas to follow up on the progress of construction. The minister of construction Jihad announced that 5,000 housing projects were built between 1980 and 1982 at a total cost of 80 billion rials.

Third, Devoting Attention to People's Health: The Islamic government has established hundreds of hospitals in villages and remote areas. It set up large numbers of health centers and clinics to provide health care for farmers. There is now 1 health unit for every 500 individuals. In 1975 there was 1 health unit for every 45,000 persons. The Islamic government has also extended water systems to villages.

Because the village received such attention, agriculture flourished. Iran now exports thousands of tons of agricultural products to Middle Eastern and African countries. In 1985-1986 total agricultural exports exceeded 500 million dollars.

Specific Model for Solving the Housing Problem: The housing problem is considered a problem whose solution is difficult in the major industrial countries of the world. These are the countries that have tremendous material and technological resources. Developing countries, however, do not think in depth about a solution to this problem because of their difficult economic situation. And after the Islamic Republic came into being, it found itself facing a housing problem which had reached a deadlock and was going nowhere as a result of the accumulated mistakes that were made under the Shah's administration. That administration had produced a society of two opposites: an elite society to whom all the requirements and luxuries of life were available, and a society of poverty and deprivation which did not have the simplest essentials for life. Under such a class policy more than 90 percent of Iran's working families and families on fixed incomes no longer owned their homes. That is why the Islamic government decided to devote all its attention to the task of providing housing to Iranian citizens. It proceeded to do everything it could to realize that objective. It laid down immediate and future plans for housing and advanced cities, and most of those plans have been implemented by means of the following:

1. Housing was made available in various Iranian cities to hundreds of thousands of families on fixed incomes and to the families of martyrs. This was done by distributing among those people the property that belonged to those families who were related to the Shah's regime. Those families had acquired their wealth by unlawful means and had gained riches at the expense of poor people.

2. The Islamic Revolution Housing Organization, the Housing Bank and the Organization for the Oppressed took part in the construction of homes. By the beginning of 1986 they had completed homes for over 150,000 families.

3. A group of government banks extended loans to the deprived classes so they can build their own homes.

Bank statistics show that in 1 year, 1986, a housing bank, an export and import bank and a workers' prosperity bank had extended loans amounting to 1,915.5 billion rials to 1,555,066 persons. From 1982 to 1986 the number of loan recipients as well as the total figure for the loans rose.

4. In 1983, 200 units producing construction materials were established. These units sold their products at low prices to encourage people to build homes and to keep brokers and black market types from exploiting the deprived classes and realizing large profits at the expense of people on fixed incomes. Between 1984 and 1986 the number of units producing construction materials rose to approximately 1,000 units and plants.

5. Eighty-four thousand housing units in cities and areas that were subjected to raids by Iraqi airplanes, surface-to-surface missiles and artillery shells have been rebuilt and refurbished. Construction is still going on in cities that were completely destroyed by the invading troops.

Education in the Service of Development

During the Shah's administration the education sector was subjected to a vicious campaign against professors, teachers, students and departments of education who had rejected courses of study that were tractable to western culture. These courses of study sought to dilute the people's Islamic character and shake their confidence in themselves and in their own aspirations. These courses of study sought to isolate the people from their Islamic surroundings.

That is why after the Islamic Republic became reality, Islamic leaders carried out a complete change in the courses of study.

Courses of study illustrate an educational philosophy that is compatible with society's philosophy. This society has sacrificed the lives of its young people so it can go back to the application of Islamic laws. That is why courses of study and textbooks that would achieve Islamic educational goals [were selected].

The change in the quality and number of universities has helped expedite the process of industrial and agricultural development. In October 1986 Prime Minister Engineer Mir Hosein Musavi said, "The association between research centers and universities is starting to yield good results. In the future, universities will become centers where decisions are made and solutions to the country's problems offered."

A quick review will shed light on changes that have taken place in the quality and number of universities:

1. Universities that build a person's character on the principles and precepts of the canonical law of Islam have been established. The previous courses of study which were offered in the old universities were changed, and new courses of study that depend on authentic Islamic culture have been adopted.

This Islamic culture has produced hundreds of philosophers and great people over hundreds of years. The Islamic government has thus effected for university students a link between the enlightened past and the radiant future.

2. The number of students admitted into universities has been increased. Official statistics mentioned that between 1982 and 1986 Iranian universities enrolled more than 42,000 undergraduate students. By comparison, the number of students who were enrolled at universities during the academic year 1976-1977 did not exceed 10,000 students.

3. Attention is being given to scientific studies, such as medicine and engineering, and new graduate departments offering masters and doctorate degrees in nuclear technology and mining have been created. More graduate students are being accepted in other scientific areas of study.

4. Preparations are being made to establish an international Islamic university that would accept students from Islamic countries, Third World countries and African countries. That university will open its doors in the next few years after its courses of study are completed and its scientific laboratories are built. That university will help break the restrictions that are being placed by western universities on students from Third World countries.

Putting Minerals to Good Use: Islamic leaders developed a broad plan to put minerals lying under the earth's surface to good use. For the first time in Iran's history companies that specialize in exploring for minerals are working in the country. More than 1,250 different mines have been discovered, and by the end of 1989, 900 of them will be operating. Returns from these mines amounted to 100 million dollars. In this regard Mr Mohammed Reza Ayatollahi, minister of mines and metals declared, "The Islamic Republic exported 190,000 tons of mineral products from 1 April 1986 to 1 January 1987. Those minerals include lead, copper, zinc, salts, ceramics and stones used in construction. These materials were exported to Japan, West Germany, and a few GCC countries. At the same time the Ministry of Mines and Metals built a factory for heat-resistant bricks with a production capacity of 50,000 tons."


Results of the Progress That Has Been Made in Development: One of the most important consequences of the economic policy that was pursued during the 8 years of the Islamic Revolution has been correcting the imbalance in the country's balance of trade. The Islamic government has not borrowed any money from capitalist banks or from the superpowers in spite of the tremendous costs of the war, which the Iraqi regime has foisted on the Islamic Revolution, and in spite of the fact that the days when oil was at a premium have come to an end. Oil prices fell to less than 10 dollars a barrel for a period that lasted 7 months. Oil prices stabilized at 18 dollars a barrel as a result of the efforts made by the Islamic Republic within OPEC at the last OPEC Conference. The Islamic Republic lost 11 billion dollars as a result of the decline in oil prices.

BRIEFS

MOJAHEDIN VISIT TO PORTUGAL--The visit to Portugal by two Mojahedin officials in the last 3 months reveals the importance that this movement attributes to our country in its concern about the continued sales of arms to Tehran. The visit by these two officials, who came from Paris where the Mojahedin have their headquarters, was principally aimed at establishing contacts with the Portuguese media and more specifically, at publicizing the socio-economic and military reality in Iran as well as the principles of the armed opposition to the Khomeyni regime. While the officials were careful not to accuse the Portuguese authorities of being providers of war material to the Iranian regime, it is obvious that the "diplomatic offensive" by the Mojahedin must be seen in the context of an informal request that our country re-examine its strategy vis-a-vis the Middle East. [Excerpt] [Lisbon TEMPO in Portuguese 19 Feb 87 p 64] /9599

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